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1. Introduction 
 
Professional Mobile Radio (PMR) has been around for many years, it started last century with the first 
analog and hugely sized portable radios which used one communication channel per assigned frequency 
band. Nowadays, PMR has evolved and is completely digital, it uses time division multiplexing and 
different coding techniques in order to make the best possible usage of the radio spectrum assigned to 
it. 
 
TErrestrial Trunked RAdio (TETRA), as specified by ETSI (2016), is a flavor of PMR designed by the 
European Telecommunications Standards Institute. TETRA is meant mostly for safety and security 
organizations, and used also by public transport, gas, oil and mining plants; it brings specific features 
critical to high availability and secure radio communications to customers in need of an own dedicated 
secure cellular network. 
 
One of TETRA’s features is the use of encrypted voice and data, which is available by using encryption 
keys in sender and receiver sides, these encryption keys can be exchanged by different mechanisms. For 
the standardization of these mechanisms, ETSI works together with the TETRA and Critical 
Communications Association (TCCA), which in turn, delegates the task to a sub-group called the Security 
and Fraud Prevention Group (SFPG), as specified by TCCA (2016). 
 
The SFPG defines a method to deliver encryption keys to all users in a TETRA network wirelessly without 
the need to take physically the TETRA Radios (TR) to the maintenance center every time there is a need 
to change encryption keys. This mechanism is called Over The Air Keying (OTAK). 
 
Prior to the project described in this thesis, in Secure Land Communications, such a mechanism did not 
exist for large-scale networks. For End-to-End Encryption (E2EE), either out of band delivery of keys 
(manual configuration) or a downgraded version of the OTAK mechanism which supported only the 
delivery of encryption keys to a few hundred users was in use. 
Once this solution using OTAK is taken into use, the amount of users served by this new solution will be 
on the range of thousands, and can be expanded to hundreds of thousands by adding several servers 
together. 
 
This thesis addresses the process of testing on a system level the implementation of the E2EE solution 
using OTAK, where all or most of the critical components interact together to perform a network traffic 
similar to that of the customer. 
 
This thesis is only a small portion of the work done to implement this solution, it neither addresses the 
development of the solution’s components nor the actual implementation of the solution in field. It 
addresses, however, the verification of the solution to find defects and follow their correction, so the 
end result will be a mature solution capable of implementing the required functionality without 
introducing unwanted side effects. 
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2. Scope of the project 
 
This project was created to fulfill one of our customer’s needs, the delivery of keys over the air from the 
keys' repository center to the mobile radios deployed in field without the need to manually reconfigure 
the set of encryption keys every time they are renewed. 
The project is quite extensive, it comprises development of new tools in 2 sites (Jyväskylä in Finland and 
Paris in France), testing in 2 sites (Paris in France and Helsinki in Finland), as well as the deployment of 
the solution in the customers network. 
 
Due to the extent of the project, the part concerning Helsinki, in which I am involved, is just a small 
portion compared to the overall project. Due to the nature of this diversification of work, I can define 
the scope of the project in the Helsinki site as the following: 
 
The scope for our department is to test over the air interface (base station to radio handheld), the 
behavior of the radio spectrum capacity when a significant amount of extra load is applied due to the 
new signaling traffic introduced with the new solution in the area covered by one Tetra Base Station 
(TBS). 
Above that, the scope of the project covers the discovery of any defects in the solution in terms of the 
tested capacity in order to make the proper corrections before deploying them into the customer's 
network. 
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3. Background Information 
 
 
3.1. Professional Mobile Radio (PMR) systems 
 
As defined by Ketterling, H. (2003) "PMR offers two-way radio communication carrying speech, data or a 
mix of both in non-public networks tailored to the specific operational needs of professional mobile user 
groups for efficient and flexible communication within their area of daily operation." 
 
As the definition specifies, these networks are non-public, mainly because the customers using PMR are 
those who do not want to use commercial operators due to security concerns; the reason for this is 
because PMR networks are widely used by safety and security organisms belonging to a specific non-
commercial organization, such as a police department of a given government. 
 
Besides of the security concerns specified above, Hans Ketterling (2003) also specifies in his book the 
requirements for what an organization usually choses PMR as its main means of communication, I list in 
the paragraph below the main attributes according to him of PMR as well as a brief explanation of the 
them: 
 
• Group, fleet and broadcast calls: Groups and other short dialing numbers can be programmed in the 
radios in order to have separate channels to use depending of what users we want to contact. 
• Dispatcher users: In PMR networks, there are usually users which orchestrate communications or 
operational management functions, these are called dispatchers. 
• Access to other communication's systems: from PMR networks, if it is allowed in the configuration, 
the users can also communicate to other systems such as PSTN, commercial cellular systems, 
internet, etc. 
• Voice and data encryption over the air and End-to-End: this is accomplished by different means; this 
thesis explains the way to accomplish End-to-End encryption; Air Interface encryption is not in the 
scope of this thesis. 
• Enabling/Disabling of radio terminals and certain modes of operations such as ambience listening 
which is a feature in which the microphone of the terminal can be activated remotely, like in the 
case of a stolen radio, or when the user cannot do any actions manually, such as a hostage situation. 
• Heavy duty equipment: users of PMR often operate in dangerous environments in which regular 
mobile phones cannot be used, such as chemical plants or where there are fires (fire department 
personnel), for that reason the radios must be designed to operate in extreme environments. 
 
The previous list of features is by no means a comprehensive list, however, it lists the most important 
points and explains why regular cellular telephony/equipment is not used by the organizations which 
chose to communicate through PMR. 
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3.1.1. What is TETRA? 
 
The Terrestrial Trunked Radio is a standard defined by the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute, which is the organization in charge to publish telecommunication standards to be used 
mandatorily in Europe. 
 
According to SELEX communications (2007), TETRA is the first truly digital PMR standard, before TETRA, 
the standard in use was called MPT1327, however, this standard was analogue, and lacked all the 
characteristics of digital communications. 
Even though TETRA was created by ETSI, it has gained worldwide approval and it is used in many other 
parts of the world outside of Europe, where it is not mandatory, but has been adopted for emergency 
and security communication networks. 
 
TETRA can be seen as a specific layer over the general PMR technology, adding services specifically 
designed for public safety organizations. 
As mentioned by ETSI (2016), there are unique PMR services in the TETRA standard, such as: 
 
• Fast access to calls and short transmission delays: fast access to calls is usually performed by a 
Push To Talk (PTT) button which gives a direct line to a pre-selected talk group. 
• Direct Mode Operation (DMO): PMR mobile stations can operate directly with one another 
(given the fact that they are on a determined distance range) without the need of a base station. 
• High level encryption (Air Interface and E2EE with different algorithms) 
• Priority calls: the user can for example make an emergency call which could take network 
resources already in use by a less important call. 
• High speed data communication with TETRA Enhanced Data Services (TEDS, not to be covered in 
this thesis). 
 
TETRA uses Time Division Multiple Access (TDMA) to allocate resources in the Air Interface (AI), every 
TBS works with one Main Control Channel (MCCH), which has the responsibility of managing the 
signaling, while the Traffic Channels (TCH) carries the voice or data accordingly. 
In TETRA, a TBS can be configured accordingly with a predefined amount of Secondary Control Channels 
(SCCH), which serve as aid channels to the MCCH in case of high traffic of signaling on that specific TBS. 
 
TETRA is at the moment suffering a transformation from purely digital PMR to hybrid communications 
due to the new range of technologies available (such as LTE), which do not support the specific 
requirements of TETRA, but when using it with TETRA, the combination allows a higher data throughput 
while still making use of TETRA specific advantages, such as group and emergency communications. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5 
 
 
3.1.2. TETRA systems 
 
As described by Secure Land Communications (2015), TETRA products range from infrastructure 
comprising traffic switches/exchanges and base stations, passing through end user hardware like 
handheld radios and dispatcher work stations, going all the way to software applications such as 
packages for managing radio subscribers or for viewing real time tracking of the radios deployed in field. 
 
SLC develops, tests, deploys and maintains TETRA core hardware and software products such as 
exchanges and base stations. Other smaller products are also developed and tested such as the TETRA 
Connectivity Server (TCS), which serves as an interface between the TETRA system and third party 
applications by implementing an Application Programming Interface (API) capable of receiving and 
delivering commands for interaction between third party equipment and the TETRA backbone. 
 
For the project related to this thesis, I only focused in a very small part of the system, that is, the 
distribution of keys for encryption of voice and short data message traffic; this traffic is distributed 
through the network using a protocol called Over The Air Keying (OTAK). In SLC’s implementation, OTAK 
End-to-End Encryption’s backbone is the Key Management Facility (KMF); the function of this KMF is to 
keep track in its database of the keys for encrypting communication, and coordinate the use of these by 
loading them over the air to the TRs which have been registered to it and which support delivery of 
encryption keys over the air. 
 
For our specific case, it is worth to notice that the core of the solution delivered by this end-to-end 
encryption project, the KMF, acts like a third party application in order to achieve connectivity with the 
TETRA network through the TCS API for delivery of encryption keys and other signaling. 
The KMF product itself, is developed in France, however, part of the testing was moved to Helsinki. 
 
In Finland also the development of other TETRA tools important for our project takes place, such as the 
Smart Card Tool (SCT) and KMF Smart Card Configurator (KSCC), which I will describe more in detail in 
sections 4.4.4.2 and 4.4.1.2 respectively. 
 
For a short description of the specific devices used in this project, see section 4.4 in this document. 
 
 
3.2. Integration & Verification 
 
“Integration is the process of combining all the unit-tested program units into a complete system.” 
(Bishop, 2008, p. 322). 
What Bishop (2008) described in that sentence of his book is exactly what we did in this project. 
 
In our case, due to an extensive list of sub-systems involved in the E2EE solution, integration and 
verification is divided in different areas, tested in geographically separate places. In Helsinki, we test 4 
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units in our system verification, these units are: DXT, TBS, TH1n (TETRA Radio) and KMF. Other units, 
such as dispatcher applications or SCT (application to program smart cards) are tested in France. 
 
The main point of our tests is to verify, once integrated, that the 4 units assigned to us work as desired, 
without interfering one with the operations of the other. On top of this, our tests in Helsinki are focused 
specifically on checking the effect that the E2EE solution using OTAK will cause over the AI. 
  
 
3.3. Cyber security 
 
3.3.1. Symmetric Encryption 
 
There are two kinds of encryption techniques, symmetric and asymmetric. For our purposes, we focus 
on symmetric encryption, because this project’s solution based on TETRA systems uses symmetric 
encryption to encrypt/decrypt the voice calls between users. 
We should know though, that symmetric encryption uses only one key to encrypt and decrypt the data, 
that makes it simple to operate, however, the challenge is to distribute the keys to all the nodes in a 
secure way, that is why the KMF solution was created. 
 
As mentioned by Stallings and Brown (2008), a symmetric encryption system has five ingredients:  
1. We have the plaintext, which is our original message, readable in clear  
2. And we have the secret key, which is used by the encryption algorithm to create  
3. The cyphertext, this is nothing more than a transposition and permutation of the plaintext by  
4. The encryption algorithm, this one only dictates the basics of how to perform the permutations 
and transpositions, but the exact operations are indicated by the secret key.  
5. The fifth element, the decryption algorithm, is nothing more than the encryption algorithm run 
in the reverse order. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 - Illustration of the 5 elements in an encrypted communication 
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3.3.2. General security concepts in TETRA systems 
 
TETRA systems are rich in security features, according to Finland’s Airbus Defence and Space (2015, d) 
there are, widely speaking, 5 areas where security can be seen in one way or another in TETRA 
networks. 
 
Area one: Authentication. 
If the network is configured for authentication, a given user must log into the network by performing an 
authentication mechanism no matter what kind of device he's using (a TR or a dispatcher station). 
 
Area two: Security features. 
Several measures can be taken to ensure security from an operational point of view, such measures 
could be for example ambience listening for hostage related scenarios, disable/enable functions in case 
a TR has been stolen, limited rights to dispatchers to allow them to use only certain functions, or 
recording of calls for audit and lawful interception. 
 
Area three: Protecting our traffic against outsiders. 
Three measures can be taken against this problem. The First and most important security measure in 
traffic protection is end to end encryption, which provides security from one end point in the system to 
the other and is the subject of this thesis. The second measure is the encryption of radio links between 
TRs and TBSs (explained shortly in section 3.3.2.4). And the third measure is to protect the links between 
the DXTs and TBSs with IPsec (not covered in this thesis). 
 
Area four: Management. 
Security in a network concerns also its management, in SLC’s implementation of TETRA systems, the 
devices can be managed remotely by secured connections (SSH and SFTP), and the actions of users can 
also be logged into an audit server. 
 
Area five: Denial of service. 
Even though this does not cause stealing of data, it would cause a disaster if it is performed, to 
countermeasure this, base stations are prepared with jamming detection techniques to avoid this 
problem. 
 
Later in this thesis, I will explain authentication and differentiate the types of encryption in a bit more 
detail. 
 
 
3.3.2.1. Authentication 
 
Even though authentication is not a feature which would be modified and/or tested during this project, 
a quick overview of it is necessary in order to have a general knowledge of the security features 
available in TETRA networks, especially because this feature is already in use in our customer’s network. 
 
As described in Finland’s Cassidian (2013), “Authentication is a function which allows the infrastructure to 
check that a mobile subscriber or a workstation user is valid to operate in the system.” 
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The document of Cassidian (2013) from Finland, states the types of authentication used in TETRA systems, we can 
summarize them as 3 types: Authentication of a mobile subscriber, authentication of a workstation user and 
authentication key distribution. 
 
For convenience, and because it is the most relevant type of authentication for our purposes, I will shortly describe 
the authentication of a mobile subscriber. 
 
In the SLC systems, the authentication of a mobile subscriber is mutual, that means that first the mobile subscriber 
must authenticate to the network, and after that, the mobile subscriber requests the network to authenticate to him as 
well. This is specified in Finnish Cassidian (2013, page 15), together with the authentication procedure explained 
below. 
 
In a simplified manner, the authentication procedure is as follows: 
 
1) The mobile subscriber registers to the network and sends a location update. 
2) The network sends to the subscriber a challenge based in 3 factors: the authentication algorithm, random 
numbers, and the authentication key. 
3) The mobile subscriber calculates the response to the challenge based on the authentication key that has 
been previously saved in its SIM card, and sends it back to the network. 
4) Once the network validates the response of the subscriber, it allows it access to the network. 
 
For this to happen, subscriber specific data (authentication key and Individual Tetra Subscriber Identity) must be 
programmed or delivered to the mobile subscriber beforehand in a secure manner, these are saved in the mobile 
subscriber’s equipment (either on a SIM card or in the radio itself). 
A third element is necessary during the authentication: the authentication algorithm, this however, can be delivered 
by the network while it provides the challenge to be answered by the mobile subscriber. 
 
 
3.3.2.2. The concept of a Crypto Group 
 
In TETRA systems, a Crypto Group (CG) is an entity which holds the relationship between Traffic 
Encryption Keys (TEKs, explained in section 4.3.1) and a range of subscribers' numbers in the network. 
 
In TETRA systems, all radio equipment is configured with an Individual Short Subscriber Identity (ISSI), 
which is the personal phone number of that radio; these ISSIs are then assigned to a User Group (UG), 
which is the bridge between the ISSIs and the CGs. Once a UG has a range of ISSIs belonging to it, it can 
also be assigned a range of CGs, and the TEKs contained in those CGs will be delivered to the range of 
ISSIs. 
 
This concept is bit difficult to understand only with words, to make it clearer; I give an example of this 
mechanism in figure 2. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Mapping of Traffic Encryption keys to Individual Short Subscriber Identities 
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In the example represented in figure 2, we can see 3 Crypto Groups, which contain 3 Traffic Encryption 
Keys respectively, which can be used by any TETRA Radio to encrypt their traffic; however, there is a 
need to assign those TEKs to specific TETRA Radios in order to have an agreement of who should use 
which keys. 
 
In the center, we can see UG 40, which is mapped to ISSI ranges 1000001 to 1000100 and 1000201 to 
1000300; this User Group is also mapped to CG 1 and 2. With this mapping, we have now assigned the 
mentioned ISSI ranges to the TEK IDs from CGs 1 and 2. 
 
The same happens with UG 45, in one side, it is mapped to the ISSI range 1000101 to 1000200, and on 
the other, it's mapped to CG 3, so the TETRA Radios in the range 1000101 to 1000200 can use TEKs with 
ID 7010, 7020 and 7030. 
 
This kind of mapping mechanism is useful because we can divide the ISSI ranges in different chunks and 
assign them separately to different UGs, like in our example, were the ISSI range assigned to UG 45 is 
actually an intermediate range between the ranges assigned to UG 40. 
Also, by dividing the TEKs into CGs, we can make sure that TRs receive some TEKs to be used only 
internally among a specified range (which can be for example an organization, UG 40 belonging to the 
Police, and UG 45 to the Fire department), and other TEKs are shared with other UGs (which can be used 
for example if there is a need for cooperation among departments). 
 
 
3.3.2.3. Key Distribution 
 
“If A and B each have an encrypted connection to a third party C, C could deliver a key on the encrypted 
links to A and B.” (Stallings and Brown, 2008, p. 618). 
 
That is the very principle of this project; the KMF was created to be the trusted source of all the mobile 
(and non-mobile) devices in the network, the KMF is the heart of the encrypted connections, it is in 
charge to maintain all the devices used with E2EE operational in the network by providing them with 
Crypto Groups, which contain the necessary keys to establish communication with the rest of the 
allowed devices, all of this is done through an encrypted connection between the KMF and the 
recipients of the keys. The system uses different keys for different purposes, which are explained in 
section 4.3 of this thesis. 
 
The keys for end to end encryption, as specified by the TETRA standard, are delivered via Short Data 
Service (SDS) messages, which are used as a bearer for the OTAK protocol in all TETRA system solutions. 
 
Signaling for key distribution is explained in more detail in section 4.5. 
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3.3.2.4. Air Interface & End-to-End Encryption 
 
In essence, Air Interface Encryption is the encryption performed between the TBS and the TR, it does not 
comprise any other parts of the network, that is, the voice/data travels in clear throughout all the wired 
network between the sending and the receiving TBSs, for this reason, E2EE needs to be implemented. 
End-to-End Encryption, on the contrary of AI Encryption, encrypts the voice/data since it leaves the 
sending RT and it travels encrypted all the way to the destination, only then, the voice/data is decrypted 
for reception. 
 
 
AI encryption AI encryption
End to End Encryption
 
Figure 3 - Difference between air interface and end-to-end encryption 
 
 
As explained in Stallings and Brown (2008), The E2EE cannot be used alone, due to the fact that if all the 
data is encrypted, the intermediate switches are not able to see the destination address, for that reason, 
in E2EE, only the payload is encrypted, and the header is left in clear, to overcome this weak point, Air 
Interface Encryption is used, encrypting the whole packet of data (header and the already encrypted 
payload) to be transmitted over the air interface. 
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4. The End-to-End Encryption Project 
 
 
4.1. Quality criteria 
 
The purpose of this project, as specified in section 2, is to deliver a mature solution with an acceptable 
quality, taking care of not affecting other parts of the system while introducing the new features related 
to E2EE and making use of them efficiently. 
 
This is the first version of E2EE developed by SLC making use of OTAK delivery of keys for large-scale 
networks, for that reason, and because of budget and time constraints, it is not expected to deliver a full 
solution with all features included, instead, some management features have been left out, and the 
efforts were focused mostly on operational characteristics, having in mind that most major aspects of 
operations must be delivered with high quality, and other minor problems can be left behind if they do 
not affect operations, these problems will be addressed in subsequent versions of this solution. 
 
 
4.2. Algorithms used 
 
The project is planned to implement 2 encryption algorithms in the customer premises. First, the 
algorithm Advanced Encryption Standard with a key bitlength of 256 will be implemented as a transition 
from the current network security state to the E2EE with OTAK delivery capability, once that algorithm is 
in use and working as desired, an algorithm designed specifically for the customer, and called for that 
purpose Customer Algorithm (CAlg), will be implemented in order to customize the security for that 
specific customer. 
 
 
4.2.1. Advanced Encryption Standard (AES256) 
 
According to Stallings and Brown (2008), the AES is a symmetric block cipher algorithm with a block 
length of 128 bits and support for keys up to 256 bits. As mentioned in their book, Stallings and Brown 
state that a symmetric block cipher algorithm produces an output block cipher of the same size of the 
block of plaintext taken as input, and all the input blocks of text have a fixed length. 
 
Operation of the Algorithm 
 
The operation of the AES in simple terms, as explained in Stallings and Brown (2008) is as follows: 
a) The plaintext is viewed as a matrix of bytes, this bytes are taken 4 at a time and placed into an 
array called “State”, this array, containing a block of 4 words of 32 bits (for a block of total 128 
bits) is then modified by several transformations. 
b) The first transformation is the substitution, for this, a table called S-box is used, for simplicity, 
this table is not shown in this document, however, we should see it as a simple table which 
maps every hexadecimal value to a new value (which is constant for all substitutions). 
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c) The second transformation is row shifting, a simple permutation is performed row by row. Since 
we are working with a matrix, each row contains 4 words of 8 bits, which is 32 bits per row, the 
amount of spaces that a byte is shift to the left depends on the position of the byte in the 
matrix, a detailed explanation of this operation is out of the scope of this thesis. 
d) The next transformation uses equations over finite fields and its purpose is to mix the columns, 
for this operation each column operates individually, and each value of each column is mapped 
to a new value that is a function of all bytes in the column; for simplicity, the exact operation 
will not be described here. 
e) The last and most important transformation is the round where we add our secret key. In this 
round we simply perform an XOR operation with the current block of data and a portion of our 
key. 
 
All this process is repeated 9 rounds (9 more times) and finishes with a 10th round of 3 stages (instead of 
4 stages).  
Figure 4 shows the stages of one round in a visual way: 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - Operation of AES256. Taken from Stallings and Brown (2008) 
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4.2.2. Customer algorithm (Calg) 
 
As part of the E2EE solution, a customized encryption algorithm can be implemented for every 
customer; this algorithm can be used instead of the AES256 algorithm generally used for encrypting 
system's communications. 
For security reasons, the customized algorithm for the customer for which this solution was designed is 
not known to anybody outside the customer’s organization. 
For the first part of this project, the customized algorithm will not be implemented; first, the solution 
will be implemented with the AES256 algorithm, after a period of time, when the solution is already in 
full operations, then the customer algorithm will be deployed in order to replace the generic AES256 
algorithm. 
It is important to mention though, that a customer can have its own algorithm, if he wishes so. 
 
 
4.3. Encryption keys used in this solution 
 
In this section, I will explain some of the encryption keys used in this project. 
 
Due to the fact that for this thesis purposes I am participating mostly in the part involving the Key 
Management Facility, which is the new feature in this encryption system, I will describe only the keys 
that interact directly with the Key Management Facility and leave out the rest of the keys used in the 
system (for example, keys used for the air interface encryption by base stations). 
 
 
4.3.1. Keys for communication (Traffic Encryption Key) 
 
According to Finland’s Airbus Defence and Space (2015, a, page 8), the keys used for encrypting audio 
and SDS messages in their systems are called Traffic Encryption Keys (TEK), these keys are used for 
encryption from one end to another, allowing to pass the encrypted data through all the system and 
only be seen in clear mode at the origin and destination. 
 
In the customer’s network will be a separation on how the TEKs are generated and managed, this 
separation will be organization specific, for example, if in the country in question there are several 
departments using the TETRA system (fire, police, army, etc.), they might be divided in organizations in 
order to keep them isolated from one another, and for this same reason, the TEKs will be generated 
locally in the organizations in which they will be used, then, the organizations will have to pass the keys 
to the KMF in an Out of Band (OOB) fashion in order to have them in the KMF database so it can then 
distribute them over the air to the intended users. 
The general concept of generation, management and distribution of TEKs looks like in figure 5: 
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Figure 5 - Example of how the TEKs are distributed by organization 
 
 
Every key domain in our solution consists of 4550 keys, and the key IDs are distributed accordingly 
through the domains, from smallest to biggest ID. For example, in domains from 0 to 9, the IDs 
contained in each domain will look like the following figure: 
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Figure 6 - Example of Key IDs in different domains 
 
 
In the customer’s case, the whole organization is divided in departments, and each department is 
assigned a set of domain IDs to use, hence, each department has its own unique set of traffic key IDs, in 
this manner, each department will produce and distribute its own keys to its users, and the key IDs will 
not overlap. The only case in which one (or several) domain IDs are shared among many departments is 
when referring to cross-department communication, for example, when using cooperation talk groups in 
case of a disaster situation (like a hurricane), the users from different departments need to 
communicate securely with each other, and consequently, they need to have common talk groups and 
the keys for encryption of communication in those talk groups. 
 
One of the jobs of the Smart Card Tool is to generate keys, be it management keys or traffic encryption 
keys. As shown in figure 5, in our fictitious scenario, there are 4 SCTs, where 3 of them belong to specific 
departments (Fire, Police and Army), these SCTs produce encryption keys belonging to their own 
organization, which are used for intra-department communication. In addition to those SCTs, there is a 
4th SCT with the name of Master SCT, the role of this SCT is to produce keys which will be delivered to 
the users of all departments in order to enable inter-department communication. The role of the Master 
SCT will be explained better in section 4.4.4.2.1 of this thesis. 
 
 
4.3.2. Keys for Tetra Radios (KEK, SEK) 
 
Besides of the Traffic Encryption Keys, there are 2 more keys used in the TETRA radios, these keys, called 
Key Encryption Key (KEK) and Signaling Encryption Key (SEK), are only used for management purposes, 
They are not meant to be sent over the air, and they do not encrypt any voice or data communication. 
 
As explained by the Finnish branch of Airbus Defence and Space (2015), The KEK and SEK are used to 
encrypt the TEKs, as shown in figure 7: 
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Figure 7 - Traffic Encryption Key sealed by management keys, taken from Finnish Airbus Defence and 
Space (2015) 
 
 
As we can see in figure 7, when delivering encryption keys over the air, the keys meant to be used for 
encryption of voice and data (TEK) are first sealed/encrypted in a management key called Key Encryption 
Key, that has the function to encrypt keys (as its name says), in our case it encrypts TEKs. This whole 
package formed by a TEK and a KEK is in turn sealed/encrypted by another management key which is 
called Signaling Encryption Key, as its name implies, SEK is meant to be exposed on the signaling 
interface of the system. 
Once this package is formed as explained here above, it is then sent over the Switching and 
Management Infrastructure (SwMI) and finally over the air to the TRs in the form of an SDS message. 
 
At the TR side, the KEK and SEK must be programmed beforehand into the Smart Card (SC) in order for 
the terminal to be able to use those keys to decrypt the OTAK messages and recover the TEK(s) 
contained in them; this means that out of band operations must be performed to deliver the 
management keys (KEK/SEK) manually to both the TRs and the KMF. 
 
The Smart Cards currently used by the Radio Terminals in our customer’s network do not support OTAK 
messaging, and all Subscribers’ SCs must be changed in order to introduce the firmware supporting 
OTAK, for this reason, it is convenient to initialize and load the new SCs with their corresponding 
KEK/SEK at the same time. The migration plan considers this issue and it is currently planned to 
massively program the SCs before they are delivered to the users. 
 
Public key infrastructure does not exist in TETRA networks because TETRA networks are designed to be 
as secured as possible, and most internet infrastructure (such as public key servers) are not used; for 
this reason, our system is a symmetrical encryption system and needs to use out of band operations to 
deliver the management keys used later to encrypt the TEKs; this is because of the customer’s wish to 
not use public methods. 
 
 
4.3.3. Keys for KMF (FEK, BEK, IEK) 
 
Besides of the previously mentioned keys, there are other encryption keys used in this solution which 
are not meant to be used for OTAK purposes, but instead for Out Of Band (OOB) purposes, these such 
keys, called File Encryption Key, Backup Encryption Key and Internal Encryption Key, are used mostly 
inside of the KMF, with the exception of FEK, which is used in all non-end user equipment (SCT, KSCC, 
KMF) when TEKs are transported OOB from one place to another. 
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FEK 
 
The File Encryption key, which is the most important of all these 3 keys, is used for encrypting 
everything that needs to be moved from one computer to another. 
The most common use for this key is to encrypt TEKs for transport between the SCT and the KMF; for 
example, in the case where we have a master SCT which produces TEKs to be used by different 
organizations, and thus, by different KMFs. 
 
Figure 8 shows a Master SCT which is in charge of generating keys for 2 KMFs, each one corresponds to 
different departments; in our example, one KMF serves the network used by the police and the other 
serves the network used by the Fire department. These 2 networks usually would work isolated from 
each other; however, in case of a critical situation, such as a major accident or a natural disaster, both 
departments would need to communicate with each other. The KMFs used in each network would 
usually generate the keys for their own talk groups, but the keys for the shared talk groups between 
those networks cannot be generated by any one of those KMFs because they need to be shared. For 
security reasons, a security officer would generate the keys of the shared groups and distribute them 
OOB to the KMFs, in this process, the FEK would be used to seal the files transported OOB from the 
Maser SCT to the KMFs. 
 
 
 
 
KMF Police KMF Fire
TCS TCS
Master SCT
DXT
 
Figure 8 - Master SCT generating keys for several KMFs 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
BEK 
 
Each KMF runs its own database, and every night, a backup of that database is performed, for security 
reasons, that backup is encrypted using the Backup Encryption Key. This key is used solely for this 
purpose and has no other use. 
 
IEK 
 
According to Finnish Airbus Defence and Space (2015, a), the Internal Encryption Key is only used to 
encrypt communication inside of a given KMF when the data travels from one component to another 
inside of the same server. 
 
All these keys, FEK, BEK and IEK, must be the same in all KMFs belonging to one specific customer. In a 
disaster recovery situation, as for example, when there is a fire in one server’s site but we have our data 
storage in a second servers’ site, we can take a backup which has been stored in the second servers’ site 
and use it to recover the information in a new server. 
 
 
4.4. Types of devices used in the project 
 
In this section, I will explain the most important elements of the E2EE solution. 
 
 
4.4.1. Key Management Facility (KMF) 
 
It is the most important element in the solution offered by this project and the element/area in which I 
am focusing the most for his thesis. 
 
This element is a server which manages the automatic distribution of Traffic Encryption Keys over the air 
to all the radios in the network, as well as the distribution to other non-mobile equipment such as Radio 
Console Systems (dispatcher workstations used by operators in the main office to communicate with 
field agents) and Recorder Gateways (Recorders are devices used to record all communication in the 
network). 
 
Besides of the previous mentioned task, the KMF also coordinates the usage of the TEKs in the storage 
of all the E2EE-capable equipment in the network. In TETRA networks, E2EE uses 3 keys, Past, Active and 
Future; this setting has the purpose of continuously use encrypted communications even when the 
expiration of old keys happen and new keys get into use.  
For example, if a validity of a key expires in a Crypto Group, some radios will change the key to a new 
one before others; if only one key is in the internal storage at a given time, the communication will be 
lost for the time between one party and another in a communication channel change keys. On the other 
hand, if the currently active key stays stored in the internal memory of the device, but it is just marked 
as past, then receiving a call from another radio which is encrypted with that key (because the other 
radio hasn’t yet changed to the new key) will end up in the end-user equipment being able to use the 
“past” key to successfully decrypt the call and communicate. 
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KMF contributes to this process by sending an activation message of the “future” key over the air to all 
E2EE-capable TETRA Radios, following by a “key load” message. 
 
 
KMF
TETRA
network
Crypto Period Expiration
CG 1
Past Active Future
1 2 3
CG 1
Past Active Future
2 3 4
Activate KeyID 3
CG 1
Past Active Future
1 2 3
CG 1
Past Active Future
2 3
Activate KeyID 3
TR1 TR2  
Figure 9 - Activation of the future key in CG1 
 
 
In figure 9, I have illustrated a basic scenario where 2 TRs have different keys as their “Active” key for 
encrypting voice calls. 
Let us assume that a given organization has a talk group which uses the TEKs in CG 1, and CG 1 is 
managed by that organization’s KMF; in the figure, for simplicity I have illustrated only the concerning 
elements. Let us assume as well that CG 1 has its three keys as follows: 
 
• The key ID number or the Past key is 1 
• The key ID number or the Active key is 2 
• The key ID number or the Future key is 3 
 
As shown in figure 9, as the time passes the period of validity of that active key comes to an end, 
consequently KMF automatically discards the Past key for that CG and moves the Active to the Past 
state; the Future key passes to the Active state at the same time that KMF generates a new key and 
places it in the Future state. Once this is done internally, KMF starts delivering keys to all the 
subscribers. In a big network where a KMF serves thousands of subscribers, not all radios would receive 
the Activation message and the new Key Load message at the same time as the other radios, this is 
mainly due to AI capacity constraints and the availability of the Main Control Channel of the TETRA air 
interface; because of this, one radio might receive an activation message many hours (or even days) 
before another; in the figure, we can see that one radio has already changed the active key to the one 
with ID 3, while the other has still the same old configuration, we can also see that the cell for the 
Future key is empty, that is because a KEY LOAD message needs to be sent to the radio once the KMF 
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produces the new key. In the configuration shown in the figure, we can see the importance of having a 
Past and a Future key, if TR2 tries to call TR1 and encrypts the communication with key ID 2, TR1 can 
decrypt it because the key is still in memory; however, if we would have only one key, the 
communication would not be possible. 
 
 
4.4.1.1. Multi Generic Encryption Module (MGEM) 
 
For encryption/decryption purposes, one of the most important parts in the KMF is the Multi Generic 
Encryption Module (MGEM), this is a board in the server which is in charge of encrypting/decrypting all 
outgoing/incoming communication. 
 
Because in KMF there is no in/out audio, the only communication passing through the MGEM is the SDS 
messages for OTAK purposes. For every OTAK message arriving/leaving KMF, the MGEM 
encrypts/decrypts the TEKs and other data as explained in section "4.3.2. Keys for Tetra Radios". 
All communication exchanged between the KMF and a given subscriber is always encrypted with the 
management keys (KEK/SEK), it does not matter if it’s an association, a key load, an activation message 
or any other type of instruction. 
 
The MGEM is also used in Radio Console Systems to encrypt/decrypt communication, in this kind of 
equipment, the MGEM is paired with another computer board called xGear16, which transmits audio 
streams; however, because the encryption functionality for RCSs was not tested in our Helsinki’s 
laboratory, it is out of the scope of this thesis and I will not go into detail. 
 
 
The MGEM looks like in figure 10 below: 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10 - MGEM, taken from the Finnish Airbus Defence and Space (2015, b) 
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4.4.1.1.1. Smart Card Module and Smart Card for KMF 
 
It is possible to see in figure 10 a small daughter board inserted into the MGEM which contains 5 smart 
cards; this is called the Smart Card Module (SCM), and it is used in every MGEM in order to hold the SCs 
which contain the appropriate keys for encryption/decryption of communication. 
 
In the context of the KMF, the SCM contains the Smart Cards for the Key Management Facility (or 
SC4KMF for short), these types of smart cards are different mainly in capacity from the SCs used in Radio 
Terminals. The KMF itself is designed to support an approximate amount of 40 000 users, in order to 
exchange information with that amount of users, the SC4KMF must have a bigger capacity than the ones 
used in TRs, each SC4KMF has the capacity to hold over 2000 pairs of management keys (KEK/SEK). In 
total, the version 1 of the KMF can hold 20 SCs, distributed in 2 MGEMs where each MGEM can hold 1 
SCM and 1 SCM can hold up to 10 SCs (5 per side). 
 
 
4.4.1.1.2. Authentication key for MGEM 
 
The hardware of the MGEM and SCs used in radio dispatchers and the KMF is in essence the same, but 
the software is different; the MGEM and SC4KMF use a special authentication key to operate together, 
this key depends on the global location of the customer and has specific details for each customer that 
cannot be used in other customer’s premises. The SC4KMF also has a different firmware loaded 
depending of the geographic region and the customer to which they belong, in this way, the SC4KMF 
cannot be reused. 
 
 
4.4.1.2. KMF's Smart Card Configurator (KSCC) 
 
The KMF's Smart Card Configurator is a tool developed for the sole purpose of initialize and program the 
smart cards for KMF. This tool cannot be used to program any other type of smart cards (as for instance, 
the SCs for TETRA radios). 
 
It is a very simple tool which is easy to use; this tool will accept a SC4KMF and produce keys based in the 
algorithm contained in the firmware of the SC which is in our case the Advanced Encryption Standard 
with a 256 bit key. When generating the keys for SC4KMF, the KSCC will produce a set containing FEK, 
BEK and IEK; once these keys are produced, the tool gives us the option to save the keys to either the SC 
itself, the local PC or the security dongle (explained in the next section).  
The keys generated must be saved to all the smart cards that will be used in the intended KMF in order 
for the smart cards to work when they are inserted in the MGEM of the KMF, the reason is because the 
FEK will be used in KMF in case TEKs are imported from a SCT (for example, the Master SCT) into the 
KMF, and the BEK and IEK will be used internally for backups and internal transfer of information. 
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4.4.1.2.1. KSCC’s accessories – User Domain Tool (UDT) for KSCC and 
security dongles 
 
The User Domain Tool (for KSCC, not to be confused with UDT for SCT) is another program which must 
be used before any operation in KSCC can be done. The sole purpose of UDT for KSCC is to create an 
authorized user which will be then allowed to log in and do operations in KSCC. The person in charge of 
using UDT and creating the authorized KSCC users must be someone completely unrelated to any 
activity in KSCC. This measure adds an extra layer of security to the overall process. 
The process of how the whole mechanism works is as described in figure 11: 
 
 
Security Officer
Creates 1 dongle for UDT user, 
and delivers an empy one for 
KSCC user creation
UDT KSCC
Logs into UDT using UDT dongle
UDT user
KSCC user
1) UDT user creates a user for KSCC
2) Loads that user into KSCC dongle
Logs into KSCC using KSCC dongle
1) KSCC user creates keys
2) Loads the keys into SC4KMF
3) Loads the keys into dongle
To KMF
 
Figure 11 - Process to operate KSCC 
 
 
We can see in figure 11 the process that needs to be done to operate KSCC and to configure the smart 
cards for KMF. 
The operator must have a security dongle for using KSCC as well as for using the UDT for KSCC which 
serves as a type of electronic identification. Without the security dongle, the programs will throw a 
security exception and terminate. 
 
The UDT operator must have a security dongle to log into his account in UDT; the company’s security 
officer is in charge of issuing that dongle configured correctly. Once the UDT user gets this dongle from 
the security officer, he can log into his account in UDT and create a user for KSCC; after creating that 
user, it must load that information into another security dongle which will be delivered to the person in 
charge of operating KSCC. 
The KSCC user can log into KSCC and create the necessary keys for configuring a SC4KMF (FEK/BEK/IEK) 
after receiving the KSCC security dongle, then load those keys into the smart cards. 
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Finally, if TEKs will be imported from SCT to KMF via out of band, as for example the cross organization 
group encryption keys, then KSCC user must load the FEK into its security dongle and transport it OOB to 
SCT in order to be able to seal the TEKs to be moved with FEK for secure transport. When KMF receives 
Out Of Band TEKs, it will be able to unseal the container because it already has the FEK loaded into the 
smart cards inserted in its Multi Generic Encryption Module. 
 
 
4.4.2. TETRA Connectivity Server (TCS) 
 
By Finnish Airbus Defence and Space (2015, c) “The TETRA Connectivity Server (TCS) provides a high-
level interface for connecting customer-specific applications to the TETRA System securely and 
efficiently. This interface is called the TCS Application Programming Interface or TCS API.” 
 
In short, we could say that the TCS is the door between SLC's TETRA Systems and the rest of the world 
when it comes to custom applications which need to do a specific job in SLC’s TETRA systems.  
There are other interfaces to the TETRA systems, for example, voice is transferred by the TVG (TETRA 
Voice Gateway) as well as Inter System Interface (ISI) and Generic 4 Wire Interface (G4WI) for other 
purposes; however, when it comes to signaling between the TETRA network and third party 
applications, the TCS is the bridge which needs to be used. 
For the purposes of this thesis, only the connection through the TCS is important and for that reason I 
will not explain the rest of the interfaces into the TETRA system. 
 
The TCS API is a piece of software that can be run in a regular Windows 7 computer or alternatively in a 
Windows server; a Windows server is used for OTAK purposes, the reason for this is that TCS running in 
a Windows 7 computer is mostly intended to run together with a dispatcher application for which a 
single user TCS software is used. For OTAK purposes; however, the TCS can be a separate generic multi 
user server which can be used by the KMF and other third party applications at the same time. 
 
 
4.4.3. TETRA Base Station (TBS) 
 
In cellular communications, “the BTS provides the direct communication with the mobile phones.” 
Poole, I. (2006). According to this author, The base station is the link between the mobile equipment 
and the network infrastructure, being this Base Station comprised of the antennas themselves and the 
electronics in charge of multiplexing and amplifying the signals; on top of this, there is a base station 
controller which is in charge of managing the resources of the base station, and in charge of 
communicating with the switching center (DXT, explained in section 4.4.5 of this thesis). 
 
In the case of SLC, all the elements mentioned above are together in the same physical device, the TBS 
contains the base station controller, radio transceivers, radio frequency multiplexers and power 
supplies; it is capable of passing signaling, voice and data traffic to the DXT, as well as to act as a 
standalone equipment routing the voice calls within the radios directly under its coverage. 
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For E2EE point of view, there is no special role for the TBS, its sole purpose is to pass the OTAK messages 
to and from the TETRA Radios. 
The TBS has a core role in Air Interface encryption and authentication of Mobile Subscribers, however, 
that subject is not covered by this thesis, for that reason, I will not get into details. 
 
 
4.4.4. TETRA Radios (TR) 
 
These are mobile devices used for TETRA networks, they are not like regular commercial phones 
because the environment of operation is quite different and they need to be resistant to more extreme 
areas of operation compared with regular consumer phones, certain TETRA Radios support End to End 
Encryption using OTAK for delivery of keys, we used a model called TH1n radio. 
 
 
4.4.4.1. Smart Cards for TRs 
 
As mentioned in section 4.4.1.1.1, there are 2 different types of Smart Cards, those meant to be used in 
the KMF’s MGEM and the rest which can be used in TRs and RCSs. The latest have a firmware designed 
to hold only 1 pair of management keys and the rest can be filled with Crypto Groups and TEKs. 
The SCs for TETRA Radios are also designed to be controlled remotely in the sense that their keys can be 
erased over the air in case the radios are lost or stolen. 
 
The Smart Cards for TETRA Radios have to be configured only once manually at initialization in order to 
write into them the Individual Short Subscriber Identity (ISSI) address of the KMF and their own pair of 
management keys (KEK/SEK); with this information, the SC is able to contact the KMF when the TR is 
switched on in order to request TEKs. 
 
 
4.4.4.2. Smart Card Tool (SCT) for TRs 
 
Smart Card Tool is a software used to configure subscriber SCs both from TETRA Radios and from Radio 
Console Systems. Besides of configuring SCs, the SCT can also create keys to be used as Traffic 
Encryption Keys; for example, if keys need to be distributed by several KMFs such as in the case of the 
cross-organization Crypto Groups. 
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The following image is an example of the SCT: 
 
 
 
Figure 12 - Example of Smart Card Tool 
 
 
In Figure 12 we can see how the KeyStore of a Smart Card looks like; in this specific SC we have 16 CGs 
which have each 3 TEKs, for each group of 3 keys there is one in “Past” state, marked with a “U” (short 
for Used), another in “Active” state marked with an “A”, and an unmarked key which is in the “Future” 
state and hasn’t been used yet. 
In the left part we also see 2 keys in the Crypto Group 0 column and although this is not shown, those 
keys are the Key Encryption Key and the Signaling Encryption Key. In this example the corresponding 
slots have been already filled; however, because CG0 is not used for traffic keys, the slots in its column 
are marked according to the type of key it holds, at the moment of initializing the SC is possible to see 
KEK or SEK engraved in them. 
 
 
4.4.4.2.1. Master and Organizational SCTs 
 
In Figure 13, we can see that there is a so called Master Smart Card Tool together with a couple of 
departmental SCTs which supply Traffic Encryption Keys from different domains to the 2 KMFs in order 
to be sent over the air. 
The role of this Master SCT is to provide the same set of keys to several KMFs in order to be distributed 
to all the users contained in the organizations which those KMFs serve. 
 
In Figure 13, we can see that one KMF is connected to its departmental SCT and to the Master SCT; for 
example, in the case of the Fire department, it has a KMF designated in the illustration as “Fire KMF” 
which is in turn connected to a Fire SCT and at the same time to the Master SCT.  
Let us assume that the Fire department has an internal talk group with number 6002563, and that this 
talk group is associated to CG1, at the same time a cross-organizational talk group with number 2008541 
exists and this cross-organizational talk group is assigned to CG2. 
In our example, Fire SCT will generate the keys for CG1 and deliver them (OOB) to the Fire KMF. At the 
same time, Master SCT will generate the keys for CG2 and deliver them (OOB) not only to the Fire KMF 
but also to the Army KMF; in this way, the users of the Fire department will be able to communicate 
with each other through talk group 6002563 in a group call encrypted with the keys contained in CG1 
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which are delivered from the Fire KMF to the users of the Fire department. But also, when necessary, 
the users of the Fire department will be able to communicate with the users of the Army department 
through the cross-organization talk group 2008541 in a group call encrypted with the keys contained in 
CG2 which were delivered to the users of both organizations by their respective KMF. 
 
 
Master SCT
Fire SCT
Army SCT
Fire KMF
Army KMF
TETRA Network
CG1
CG2
CG2
6002563
2008541
 
Figure 13 - Master SCT delivers keys to several KMFs 
 
In our previous example we are assuming that the KMFs rely in a departmental SCT to generate the 
keys; I explained it like that in order to make the role of the Master SCT clearer. However, in reality, the 
TEKs for intra-agency organization are generated locally in their respective KMFs for convenience and 
the Master SCT generates only shared TEKs. 
 
 
4.4.4.2.2. SCT’s accessories (UDT and security dongles) 
 
The SCT also makes use of a User Domain Tool in a similar manner as the KSCC, this serves as an extra 
security measure because it is operated by another person whose role is to only create users and assign 
those users a key domain for use in the SCT. 
 
The concept of the SCT´s dongles and UDT is in principle the same as in KSCC, with some few 
differences: 
 
a) The KSCC is a software derived from the SCT, thus, the accompanying elements and process of 
operation are very similar; however, being the parent software, the SCT software has a richer 
design. 
b) SCT uses different domain ranges for TEK creation, on the contrary of the KSCC, which uses only 
1 domain range for FEK/IEK/BEK creation. 
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Figure 14 illustrates the process for using the SCT; the process is very similar as that of the Figure 11 
corresponding to KSCC, except for the steps performed in UDT and SCT stages, which are different: 
 
 
 
Figure 14 - Process for SCT user creation and usage 
 
 
It is imperative to make clear that the UDT used for SCT and for KSCC are not the same, each tool (SCT 
and KSCC) has its own version of User Domain Tool, and the users created for example in the UDT from 
SCT, will not work in KSCC and vice versa. 
 
 
4.4.4.2.3. Encryption certificates 
 
For an extra layer of security in OOB management of keys, the E2EE solution uses SMIME certificates on 
top of the FEK encrypted files. 
Every time a file, whatever it is (TEKs, Associations, KEKs/SEKs, etc.), is moved from one computer to 
another via an external memory storage, the file is automatically sealed with an SMIME certificate 
previously installed in the computer where the file is being produced. The same certificate must be 
installed in the destination computer in order to decrypt the file. 
SMIME is not used when sending OTAK messages, it is merely used for OOB management purposes. 
 
 
4.4.5. Digital eXchange for TETRA (DXT) 
 
In cellular systems, the Mobile Switching Center is the most important component of the whole 
network; in SLC’s TETRA implementation, that device is called Digital eXchange for TETRA (DXT) and its 
main purpose is to route the voice calls and data between all the subscribers in the network. 
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There have been many DXT models throughout the history. More than 20 years ago the DXT was a huge 
switching cabinet that could easily take a full small room; at the time of writing this thesis, however, the 
DXT is a box smaller than a dish washer machine and uses the Advanced Telecommunications 
Computing Architecture (ATCA); most of its components are virtual computer units doing the functions 
of what once were enormous physical devices accommodated in a continuous array of cabinets. 
 
Figure 15 below shows a picture of the DXT: 
 
 
 
Figure 15 - DXTA by SLC, taken from Sturtzel, A. (2015) 
 
 
The DXT has many different interfaces and it’s capable of connecting to different devices in order to 
obtain their services for different purposes. 
Some of the main tasks and functions of the DXT are enumerated below; the services from the third 
point onwards might or might not be in use depending on the customer: 
 
• Maintain a numerical tree for traffic routing 
• Switch calls and data transfer among different subscribers 
• Manage trunk links with other DXTs 
• Manage charging services 
• Manage statistics (for traffic, load, etc.) and reporting 
• Together with the Enhanced Packet Data Gateway (not covered in this thesis), routes packet 
data to its destination 
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• Communicate with external systems such as PSTN, PABX, ISDN and other cellular radio networks 
• Connect different applications to the TETRA network such as voice dispatchers, management 
applications, network monitoring centers, etc. 
 
Due to the extensive nature of this specific device, it would take a whole document to describe every 
function of it, for that reason and because the focus of this thesis is in security and encryption 
management, I will not get into more details regarding switching telephony 
 
 
4.5. From key generation to call establishment, the process explained 
 
 
In any kind of encryption mechanism is recommended to change the encryption keys every certain 
period, for that reason, in our End-to-End Encryption system the keys used for communication are 
changed in a regular basis configurable by the user. In the case of our tests in the lab, we used a 1 hour 
for the crypto period expiration; however, in the customer network it could be several weeks. 
In this section, first I will explain shortly how the keys are generated, then, once the keys are ready, they 
need to be distributed, I explain the signaling concerning their distribution in the second section; and at 
the end when the keys are in the end user equipment, I explain how a call is established. 
 
 
4.5.1 Key generation 
 
Keys are generated in 2 ways in our End-to-End Encryption solution, directly inside of the Key 
Management Facility before they are distributed to all subscribers, or in an external software hosted in a 
different computer called Smart Card Tool. 
 
When all the TETRA Radios that need to communicate are served by one single KMF, then that KMF can 
generate and distribute the keys by itself as seen in figure 16.a: 
 
KMF TETRA network
TETRA Base Station
TETRA Radio
TETRA Radio
API
Key generation/
distribution
 
Figure 16.a - Keys generated inside of KMF 
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However, when the TETRA Radios which need to communicate are served by different KMFs as in figure 
16.b, where KMF 1 serves TR 1, and KMF 2 serves TR 2, an external software needs to generate the keys 
and passed them to the corresponding KMFs for their distribution; otherwise, if one of the KMFs would 
generate them, the other would have no idea of what keys are being distributed 
 
KMF 1
TETRA network
TETRA Base Station
TETRA Radio 1
TETRA Radio 2
API
Key distribution
KMF 2
Master SCT
Key generation
Key distribution
Figure 16.b - Keys generated outside of KMF
 
In our End-to-End Encryption solution, the party in charge of generating the keys hosts a physical board 
containing the key generation machine, this board, called Multi Generic Encryption Module (explained in 
section 4.4.1.1), contains a number of Smart Card, which in turn contain the algorithm necessary to 
generate the keys. 
 
 
4.5.2. Key exchange 
 
Several steps must be performed first for key generation and exchange in order to establish a successful 
end-to-end encrypted call using this solution. These steps, as well as other details in signaling is 
described here below: 
 
1) As a pre-requisite, all the devices intended to work in end-to-end encrypted mode, must first 
receive a properly configured smart card (SC), these smart cards must be pre-programmed with 
a set of management keys (Key Encryption Key/Signaling Encryption Key) which are used to 
decrypt the keys used for communication (Traffic Encryption Keys) when these are received 
encrypted on messages through the Over The Air Keying (OTAK) protocol. 
During the pre-programming of a smart card also the Key Management Facility’s (KMF) 
Individual Short Subscriber Identity (ISSI) must be included, in this way the TETRA Radios (TRs) 
will be able to contact the KMF during registration in order to receive the rest of the required 
information. 
Because there are thousands of mobile users in the customer’s network, all the required smart 
cards will be first massively pre-programmed and then distributed to all users. 
2) Once the SC is properly pre-programmed and inserted into a TR, it needs to be switched on and 
when this happens the TR registers to the TETRA network in a regular way, at the same time, the 
TR will send a registration message to the KMF to register as a client for OTAK protocol 
messages reception, making in this way itself available to receive OTAK messages containing 
TEKs which will be used later to encrypt/decrypt communications (voice calls and text 
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messages). This registration message is encrypted with the KEK previously pre-programmed in 
the SC. 
3) The first time the KMF receives a registration message (first time an end-to-end encrypted TR is 
switched on), it will bond the ISSI address from which it was received together with the 
management key (KEK) in which the registration message was encrypted; in this way KMF knows 
who is using what key for signaling (exchange of OTAK protocol messages). 
4) Once KMF registers a given TR into its database, it will look up the User Group (UG) to which the 
TR belongs and deliver all associations and encryption keys corresponding to that specific TETRA 
Radio’s User Group. 
5) When the TR in question has received all associations and encryption keys corresponding to its 
UG, it will be able to start communicating to other TRs. 
 
 
Before I continue explaining the procedure to establish an end-to-end encrypted call, I want to present 
in a graphical manner the steps 1 to 5 previously described. 
 
 
 
 
Smart Card Tool PC TETRA Radio TETRA
network
KMF
SC pre-programming
KEK/SEK + KMF’s ISSI
Deploy SC to TR
Out Of Band
OTAK
Turn on
TETRA Registration
Other
Signaling
End-to-End Encryption Registration
E2EE registration Ack
KEK <-> ISSI bonding
- Look up info for TR
- What associations 
and keys to deliver
Deliver OTAK messages = Associations + Keys
Acknowledge OTAK messages
Ready to communicate
 
 
Figure 17 - Sequence diagram for key exchange signaling 
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4.5.3. Call establishment 
 
Once all the signaling to deliver the encryption keys described in section 4.5.2 is done, the TR can start 
communicating. The procedure to establish a call using our End-to-End Encryption solution is as follows: 
 
1) The user dials a number for an individual call or alternatively pushes the Push-To-Talk button on 
a previously selected Talk Group to start a call. 
2) Let us concentrate in the case of an individual call for this example. Once the user presses the 
“Dial” button, the TR looks up in its SC for the list of associations previously delivered by KMF, 
when it finds a suitable match for the destination address, it looks for the “active” encryption 
key contained in the Crypto Group mapped to the destination address. 
3) Having found the correct encryption key, the TR encrypts the voice call with that crypto key and 
starts sending the voice packets (circuit switched TDMA based) over the network. 
4) The steps 1 to 3 assume that the corresponding key has been delivered to the other end of the 
voice call using the procedure in section 4.5.2, hence, the recipient is able to answer and 
decrypt the call. 
 
Last but not least, here is a graphical representation of the procedure to establish a call using our End-
to-End Encryption system: 
 
TR 1020033 TR 1020034TETRA network
Dials 1020034
Looks up a match
for 1020034
Finds the ”active” key and 
uses it for encryption
ISSI # CG ID
1020031 1
1020032 2
1020034 3
Crypto Group 3
Past key Active key Future key
50001 50002 50003
Starts Communicating with TR 
1020034 using key 50002 Call ongoing
Call ongoing
TR 1020034 is ready to decrypt 
a call comming from 
TR1020033 using key 50002
 
 
Figure 18 - Process of call establishment using our End-to-End Encryption system 
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4.6. The project explained in stages 
 
In this section I will talk about the project stages from the point of view concerning the responsibilities 
of the Helsinki’s office. 
 
This was a multi-site project, in which teams from 3 different locations were involved (Paris, Helsinki and 
Jyväskylä), and the tools/processes were divided so each site had its own responsibilities in the overall 
success of the project. For this reason, I will describe the stages undertaken in Helsinki, in which I was 
directly involved. 
 
Figure 19 illustrates an overview of the project’s phases in Helsinki: 
 
 
Figure 19 - Illustration of the phases of the project in Helsinki 
 
 
4.6.1. Planning Phase 
 
At the beginning of this phase, my main task was to absorb an overall knowledge of the design and 
underneath technology of both the solution in general and the customer’s network architecture, in 
order to be able to do the real work later. For this purpose, I had several meetings with the network 
architects in order to gain knowledge of how the customer’s TETRA network was structured, what was 
the expected traffic over which our traffic load profile should be based, as well as what was the crypto 
configuration expected to be present in the customer’s network, so then with this information generate 
a verification strategy/test plan tailored for our customer’s needs. 
 
At the end of this phase, I focused on preparing a verification testing strategy definition and a test plan 
for KMF’s verification testing over the air interface. I generated 2 files, an overall verification strategy 
and a test plan, explained in section 4.6.1 of this document. 
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4.6.2. Test environment 
 
The environment building started during my training period in the KMF tool, at that time, my colleague 
in charge of the air interface signaling analysis started to deploy the infrastructure concerning the air 
interface link between the base stations and the radio terminals (for convenience and regulatory issues, 
we use cabling in the lab instead of transmitting traffic on microwaves over the air). 
In Airbus Helsinki’s lab, there is a specific area dedicated to testing the TETRA tools over the air 
interface, so he only needed to do small modifications to an already deployed environment, such as 
changing configurations in the TBS and adding more dock points for TRs (car kits to hold the TRs, 
computers to monitor their traffic and cabling to isolate the AI from unwanted external noise). 
 
Once I received training concerning the KMF tool, and we had the necessary physical equipment 
(servers, smart cards, etc.) I started to build the part of the network concerning the KMF (Installing and 
commissioning the server, then integrate it to the TETRA network through the TCS). 
The AI network architecture is specified in section 4.6.1.2 of this thesis. 
 
 
4.6.3. Air Interface (AI) capacity testing 
 
KMF product testing was performed in France. Once that testing was completed, and the KMF product 
team has released an official version of the KMF, we started to test the solution in Helsinki focused in 
the impact of it on the customer’s mimicked TETRA network we had built in our lab. 
 
This testing’s primary purpose was to find how the network overall would be affected by this new 
solution taking into account the Air Interface capacity between the TETRA Base Stations and the Radio 
Terminals. 
 
The Air Interface is usually a bottleneck in the traffic flow because of the physical characteristics of the 
radio spectrum, which will affect the performance of the rest of the network, for that reason, it is 
mandatory to test how a new solution’s introduced traffic would impact the normal traffic such as voice 
calls, TR’s tracking signaling, etc. 
 
 
4.7. Thesis work in practice 
 
This section provides the details of my contributions to the project. 
 
The format in which I decided to present this section corresponds to the timeline of the events and the 
phases of the project. 
 
I start by explaining the activities I performed during the planning phase, what documents I produced, 
and an overview of the information contained in those documents. 
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I then dig into the details of the Air Interface testing, I talk about the network architecture and 
configuration we deployed, how the test plan for AI was performed, as well as about the defects found 
and their corresponding solutions. 
 
 
4.7.1. Activities during the planning phase 
 
Since this was the first stage of the project for Helsinki’s office, the very first activity I had was to absorb 
the knowledge concerning E2EE, for that I started by studying the available documentation because I 
was not familiar with E2EE in TETRA networks before.  
It was not easy to learn the implementation of E2EE with OTAK messaging because there was not much 
formal documentation about it since this is the first version of the KMF and also a new implementation 
of the OTAK standards for E2EE defined by TETRA SFPG (Security and Fraud Prevention Group), and by 
consequence, our own documentation regarding the implementation of the standards in our solution 
was not yet written. 
I was able to gain the mentioned knowledge by having meetings with network architects and reading 
internal documents they had written during the previous months when they designed the solution, as 
well as traveling to France (where the KMF had been developed and tested at a product level) for a 
week of hands-on training in installing and configuring KMF. 
 
The second most important thing during the planning phase was to define a test strategy to be 
performed in Helsinki and a test plan for the testing activities assigned to us. 
 
In the following 2 subsections I explained my contribution to this test plan and strategy. 
 
 
4.7.1.1. Load profile and testing strategy definition 
 
During the first months of my thesis, and after the initial phase of familiarizing myself with the project, I 
started to work in defining a strategy for testing the corresponding parts of the project assigned to our 
office in Helsinki. This strategy comprised the definition of a traffic profile to load the networks during 
our testing, the requirements to build a suitable test environment for each of the 2 testing phases, and 
an outline of the general strategy to be performed during the following months. 
 
I will explain in this thesis the main points covered in the test strategy document in a shortly manner, 
but covering the most important information. 
 
 
Testing strategy definition 
 
In the E2EE project, I proposed and created the test strategy for the responsibilities assigned to our 
office in Helsinki. In order to do this, I created a document in which I specified the main points to cover 
during our tests as well as how we would achieve that testing. 
 
The test strategy document describes what kind of tests we would do in Helsinki (OTAK traffic affecting 
the AI capacity), as well details of what is needed for those tests. 
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In that document I propose the network architecture to be used in our laboratory (explained in section 
4.6.1.2 of this thesis), as well as the investments we needed to do to have the necessary equipment to 
perform those tests. 
 
The mentioned document also describes the scope of our tests, which is, in a simple matter of saying, to 
find out how an artificial network build as a down-dimensioned copy of the real customer’s network is 
affected when the signaling traffic generated by this solution is loaded into it. On top of this point, our 
tests are intended to verify the components of the OTAK E2EE solution at a system level, and report 
every found defect to the corresponding area (KMF, TR, or TETRA network side) for correction and 
retesting before the solution is deployed in the customer’s network. 
The load profile traffic (explained here below) is also specified in the test strategy definition, in order to 
explain the facts in which the proposed down-dimensioned network architecture was based. 
 
 
Air interface load profile 
 
The load profile contains the traffic to be expected to happen when the E2EE solution with OTAK key 
delivery is deployed into the customer network. 
Because the main purpose of the testing is to check how the air interface will behave when the new 
OTAK messaging is introduced and then in use at the customer’s network, the traffic in this profile is 
similar to that of the real conditions. 
 
The load profile has to be divided into 2 parts representing the current traffic on the network, and the 
new OTAK traffic is then introduced. 
 
The current traffic, which I called “Background traffic”, is the combination of group calls, individual calls, 
data messages (SDS), etc. This mentioned traffic is happening before, during, and after the new OTAK 
messaging traffic is introduced. 
 
The new traffic, which from now on I will call only “OTAK traffic”, includes all the messaging necessary to 
register, receive and acknowledge all messages sent by the KMF to the tetra radios, being encryption 
keys, associations to use those encryption keys, activations of the keys and any other type of messages. 
 
During the registration of the mobile subscriber to the network, there is extra signaling besides of the 
OTAK traffic due to the protocols proper of the TETRA standard, for simplicity, this extra traffic is 
specified separately. 
 
All numbers described in this load profile are averages. 
 
 
Background traffic 
 
The following table describes the breakdown of the signaling in terms of unit per time, it is estimated 
that there are in average 65 tetra radios per base station at any given time, so the following amounts 
are based in this number: 
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  Background traffic   
Protocol Direction Amount Duration (s) Repetition Comments 
Group call   325 20 Hour   
Late entry Down 1   Second As a broadcast 
Individual call   65 180 Hour   
PSTN/PABX call   65 180 Hour   
Individual Status Any 65   Hour 16 bits 
Individual SDS Any 65   Hour 64 characters. Acknowledged 
Group Status Any 65   Hour 16 bits 
Group SDS Any 65   Hour 64 characters. Acknowledged 
Group Management 
SDS Down 129   Work shift   
Roaming (Inter-DXT)   129   Hour   
Handover (Intra-DXT)   65   Hour   
Packet data   104,4643   Hour milli-earlang 
AVL Up 129   Minute   
Table 1 - Background traffic for AI testing 
 
 
Due to the nature of this testing phase, the traffic proposed is based in the amount of traffic generated 
per subscriber multiplied by the number of subscribers found in a single base station. In short, the 
amount of traffic per subscriber is as follows: 
 
• 5 group calls of 20 seconds of duration per hour per subscriber 
• 1 individual call of 3 minutes of duration per hour per subscriber 
• 1 call to external systems (eg. PSTN) of 3 minutes of duration per hour per subscriber 
• 1 individual status message of 16 bits per subscriber per hour 
• 1 individual SDS message (and its acknowledgement) of 64 characters per subscriber per hour 
• 1 status message of 16 bits to a group per subscriber per hour 
• 1 SDS message (and its acknowledgement) of 64 characters to a group per subscriber per hour 
• 2 subscribers moving to/from an area covered by another DXT (roaming) per hour 
• 1 subscriber moving to/from an area covered by another TBS but same DXT (handover) per hour 
• A total of 104.46 milli-erlang of packet data transmitted in the TBS per hour 
• 2 Automatic Vehicle Location messages sent per user every minute 
• Additional to the previous traffic, a late entry signal is sent every second as a broadcast in the AI 
 
 
Registrations 
 
In the customer’s network, a work day is divided in work shifts, every shift last 6 hours, for a total of 4 
work shifts in one day, taking this into account, and by the fact that workers turn on their mobile radios 
at the beginning of their work shift, we can come to the conclusion that most registrations in the 
network happen in bursts of short time frames every 6 hours, this time windows last usually few 
minutes, depending on the people, and on the department those people will be working at. 
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In general, and by consulting with the system architect of the customer’s network, we came to the 
conclusion that the majority of users turn on their radios and register within 5 to 15 minutes after their 
work shifts begin. Based in that information, we decided to have 3 basic time frames for our testing, 
one, being the most flexible, is when all subscribers register to the network in 15 minutes, another is 
when all subscribers register in 10 minutes, and the last one, which is the most dangerous, when all 
subscribers register within 5 minutes of the start of their work shift. 
 
With the previous information, and considering the same criteria as explained in the background traffic 
section regarding the number of subscribers to be included in a TBS. I produced the following table: 
 
 
    One Work Shift     
  Signaling messages for 65 TR registrations   
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Traffic common for all cases 
  Time   Protocol Direction # 
      Location Up 55 
      Update     
First First First Demand     
3 6 9 Mutual Up 110 
Minutes Minutes Minutes Authentication Down 110 
      Accept Down 55 
      Group Down NA 
      Reporting     
      Location Up 10 
      Update     
Next Next Next Demand     
2 4 6 Mutual Up 20 
Minutes Minutes Minutes Authentication Down 20 
      Accept Down 10 
      Group Down NA 
      Reporting     
Table 2 - Registrations per work shift in a TBS for the testing 
 
 
In table 2, we can see the 3 time frames in which we are going to base our testing; these time frames are 
marked as case1, case2 and case3. Each case is subdivided in 2 time slots, the first one is 3/5 of the total 
time, while the second one is 2/5 of the total time for all cases. 
When talking to the system architect, we came to the conclusion that most of the subscribers (being 
85%) register in during the very beginning of the times we had specified (our 5, 10 and 15 minute cases), 
thus, by his advice,  I took the first 3/5 as the time when 85% of the users register to the network at the 
beginning of their work shifts, and the other 2/5 of the time, is used to register only the rest of the 
subscribers, being only 15%. 
Because of this, we can see in the table that the total number of subscribers (65) is split in 2 amounts, 55 
radios during the first 3/5 of the time, and 10 radios during the last 2/5 of the time. 
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In the right part of the table, I depicted the signaling messages used during the registration of the 
amount of mobile radios I explained in the previous paragraph. The regular registration protocol in the 
TETRA standard is, in a very simple way of explaining, as follows: 
 
• A mobile subscriber powers up and sends a location update demand message to the base 
station in order to advertise that it is on. 
• The base station then sends a challenge to the radio in order to authenticate it. 
• The radio responds with the answer to the challenge. 
• The base station sends an accept message and the communication can start. 
• The base station then sends a report of the groups to be used in the radio 
 
This registration’s traffic explained above, together with the background traffic, is what we can expect at 
every beginning of a work shift in the customer’s network, this is the basic load with similar conditions 
as in the customer network, and our purpose will be, to test on top of that, the OTAK traffic to be 
introduced when the E2EE solution is deployed. In order to do that, we need to define the OTAK traffic 
both during the implementation of the solution, which is when all equipment is migrated to use E2EE 
with over the air keying, and during the rest of the time, when regular registration and rekeying of 
radios will happen, but no initial configuration is needed. 
 
 
OTAK 
 
According to our collected customer’s data corresponding to the network architecture and the expected 
delivery of keys for E2EE purposes defined by their crypto plan, I calculated the average OTAK messaging 
expected in the customer’s network, in order to have a basis upon where our test plan and environment 
should be based. 
 
There are 3 basic cases considered which define the main load of E2EE OTAK traffic, I explain them here 
below. 
 
 
Initial Configuration or Deployment Phase 
 
During the deployment of the solution in the customer’s network, the TRs are going to be migrated to 
E2EE with OTAK capability little by little, with this concept, we can visualize that because few TRs are 
migrated per day, also the OTAK traffic will be increasing every day until the point that all Tetra Radios 
are using E2EE with OTAK capability. On top of that, we must consider that the OTAK traffic during the 
first registrations is much higher that during regular (already configured) TR registration, this is because 
during the first registration, the TR will receive all crypto configuration at once from KMF, hence creating 
a high load of traffic in the network. 
Figure 20 shows the calculation of a 10 times load of expected OTAK traffic during the initial registration 
for 64 Smart Cards (the average amount of TRs expected per TBS in every work shift). 
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Figure 20 - A 10 times load of expected OTAK traffic per work shift in a TBS 
 
 
Regular registration at every work shift 
 
In the right part of the graphic in figure 20, we can see that the line drops significantly, that is the 
amount of OTAK traffic expected every time a work shift starts, when all TRs have already registered and 
there is no need to do an initial configuration, in this thesis, I call it “Regular Phase”, and it is explained 
in section 4.6.1.3. 
 
 
Crypto period expiration 
 
When a crypto period expiration happens, all Crypto Groups configured with that crypto period need to 
be renewed, to do this, the KMF will generate new random encryption keys prior to deliver them to the 
TRs containing the mentioned CGs. 
I assumed that for better resilience, all CGs within a given KMF will be expired at the same time, which 
will cause the generation and delivery of keys to all Tetra Radios served by the mentioned KMF. 
 
The crypto period expiration OTAK calculations can be divided into 2 main cases, one being the delivery 
of OTAK messages to current online TETRA Radios (the ones currently in service during the work shift), 
and the delivery of OTAK messages to offline TETRA Radios (not actively online during the moment of 
key generation, but which will be updated at the time they come back online). 
 
Table 3 shows the amount of OTAK messages expected to be sent to the average amount of online 
TETRA Radios present in a TETRA Base Station during a given work shift if the total amount of CGs is 
renewed at the same time (the number of CGs is defined by the customer’s crypto plan): 
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Table 3 - OTAK messaging sent to online radios after a crypto period expiration 
 
 
For the case where the OTAK messages are sent to the TETRA Radios which are offline at the moment of 
key renewal, the calculations need to be specified in a slightly different way, because as explained in 
section 4.6.1.3, the TRs are not expected to come at once online, and for that reason, I specified a 85% 
and 15% of registration traffic to happen in 3/5 and 2/5 of the time respectively (for more details see 
the corresponding test case scenario in section 4.6.1.3). 
Table 4 shows the calculated amount of OTAK traffic for the specified percentages of TRs and duration 
of the registration. 
 
 
 
Table 4 - OTAK message traffic for key renewal when TRs become available 
 
 
The following section explains how the given amount of traffic described in this load profile is used for 
the planned test cases during the verification phase in Helsinki’s laboratory. 
 
 
4.7.1.2. Lab network for AI load testing 
 
In figure 21 is shown the laboratory network we built to support the required amount of traffic specified 
in the customer’s network. 
The figure does not show all the elements in the network, non-relevant elements (such as monitoring 
computers or CDD server) have been left out for the sake of simplicity and because they do not affect 
directly the flow of traffic concerning the E2EE solution; only the network elements directly affecting 
E2EE are shown in the figure. 
 
Crypto Period Expiration OTAKs sent to the currently online TRs
Smart Cards
64,28 ~ 65
DownLink OTAK UpLink (Acks)
520 520
Crypto Period Expiration OTAKs sent to TRs next time they go online (includes registration)
Smart Cards 85 % out of total SCs 15% out of total SCs
64 54,4 ~ 55 9,6 ~ 10
DownLink OTAK UpLink (Acks) DownLink OTAK UpLink (Acks)
495 550 90 100
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Figure 21 - Laboratory network for Air Interface testing 
 
 
I am going to explain shortly the purpose of each element in the laboratory’s test network: 
 
• Management PC: At the top of the figure we can see this device which is a Windows 7 computer 
used to do general management of the E2EE elements in the network, inside of it is installed the 
KSCC and SCT (explained in sections 4.4.1.2 and 4.4.4.2) in order to manage Smart Card’s 
configurations, it also has a remote connection to the KMF in order to do operations in KMF’s 
GUI or to debug found defects from the log files. 
• KMF: It is remotely IP connected to the management PC and connected to the TETRA network 
(DXT) through the TCS API (explained in section 4.4.2) in order to deliver E2EE key material to 
the intended recipients. 
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• DXT3s: their purpose is to switch the voice and data packets in the TETRA network, it is 
connected directly to the TETRA Base Stations which in turn transmit the mentioned packets to 
the end users (Radio Terminals), it is also connected directly to the RCS and DWS (dispatcher 
workstations) as well as to the TCS server (which acts as a bridge between the TETRA network 
and the outside network/KMF) 
• RCS and DWS: In this specific test network, these dispatchers have the following purpose. RCS is 
used to receive group voice calls; normally, we would need at least 2 TRs to create a group call, 
however, because RCS can have several group calls open at the same time, we only need TRs as 
senders and doing so reduces the amount of required TRs for background traffic. DWS is used to 
do management operations inside of the TETRA network (such as adding subscribers, modifying 
organizations, etc.) 
• TBSs: there are 3 TBSs in the network but only one is monitored for our tests, the other 2 TBSs 
are used for handover and roaming purposes (for background traffic) 
• TETRA Radios: We can see that there are 2 different types of TRs, one of the groups has label 
“TH1n” and the other one has label “TR”. In SLC’s systems, only TH1n radios support OTAK E2EE, 
and due to the fact that they would be switched on/off frequently they are used with the sole 
purpose of exchanging OTAK signaling with the KMF. The other type labeled “TR” is an old 
model which we used only to create background traffic (calls, messages, handovers, etc.) 
 
 
4.7.1.3. Test plan and test coverage definition 
 
The Air Interface testing covers the analysis of the signaling generated by the E2EE OTAK messaging 
traffic over the Air Interface to find any bottlenecks and other possible defects generated by the newly 
introduced solution. This is accomplished by saturating the AI capacity with peak loads of traffic and 
analyzing its consequences in the behavior of the devices involved in the OTAK traffic flow. 
 
In order to perform this task, I designed a test plan for the different uses of E2EE OTAK traffic expected 
in the customer’s network, and focused especially in the cases where high loads of OTAK traffic is 
expected at one given time. 
Figure 22 shows my concept of E2EE OTAK testing over the Air Interface. The figure depicts 28 test 
cases, which form the basis of the E2EE OTAK testing over the AI. These 28 cases are divided in 4 testing 
sub-divisions, which correspond to the most critical phases of expected OTAK traffic in the customer’s 
network. 
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Figure 22 - Air Interface testing distribution 
 
We can see in figure 22 that the sub-divisions of the AI testing correspond to the different calculations 
of OTAK traffic presented in section 4.6.1.1. 
 
In the first sub-division of the air interface testing (Initial Phase) there are 16 test cases, and from the 
fact that in the customer’s network, the average number of SCs present in a TBS at a given one time is 
3.5, we can conclude the results in table 5: 
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Table 5 - Number of UL and DL OTAK messages taken into account for the Initial Phase test cases 
 
In order to explain table 5, it is necessary to state the following points. 
According to the customer’s network traffic information collected from the system architects: 
• Every DXT serves an average of 58.3 TBS 
• Every DXT serves an average of 15 000 SCs from TRs, which divided by the 58.3 TBS gives an 
average of 257.28 served by one TBS in one DXT. 
• There will be 1000 Smart Cards migrated in the whole network to E2EE with OTAK capability per 
day 
• There are 12 DXTs in the customer’s network 
• 1000 SCs migrated to OTAK per day in the whole network means that 83.33 SCs will be migrated 
in average per DXT 
• 83.3 SCs migrated per DXT divided by 58.3 TBS operating under a DXT tells us that 1.42 SCs will 
be migrated per under a TBS per day 
• There are 4 work shifts of 6 hours in the customer’s network 
• We have an average migration of 1.42 SCs under every TBS served by a DXT per day. That 
number of SCs is divided by 4 work shifts, which gives us 0.35 SCs in average. 
 
 0.35 SCs migrated under a given TBS per day is not enough to test the AI capacity for its breaking 
point, because of this; I decided to augment that number 10 times, in order to have a more 
representative amount of traffic. This gives us the number seen in table 5 under the column 
“Smart Cards”. Although calculations based on average amount of traffic are not the best to 
dimension the traffic load, it was the only traffic information available in order to produce the 
given calculations. 
 
According to the network architects, it has been seen in the customer network that at the beginning of a 
work shift, most users (roughly 85%) register to the network, while the rest (roughly 15%) register a 
short time after all the rest. This forms the basis of the numbers shown in table 5, where 3 SCs’ (a 
rounded number corresponding to 85% of the TRs) OTAK messages are separated from the other 1 SC’s 
(rounded from the remaining 15% of TRs) OTAK messages. 
 
Because we are testing the behavior of the solution over the AI, there is no need to analyze the traffic 
from more than 1 TBS, which means that from figure 21 (network test environment) we only need 4 
TH1n radios at any one time, however, for resiliency purposes, and because we had 35 TH1n radios 
available when testing the TETRA Radios’ side of the solution (testing performed by Jyväskylä’s 
Initial configurations per work shift per TBS
Smart Cards 85% out of total SCs 15% out of total SCs
3,571428571 3,04  ~ 3 0,535714286  ~ 1
DownLink OTAK UpLink OTAK DownLink OTAK UpLink OTAK
117 120 39 40
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engineers, hence, not included in this thesis), then we decided to use all 35 TH1n radios to increase the 
load of the network and aim to reach peak levels. 
 
 
Initial phase testing 
 
This test phase is divided into 16 test cases because considering that 4 SCs are migrated to OTAK during 
every work shift, and that it happens 4 times in 1 day, then it would take us 16 days to migrate all the 
256 SCs served in average per TBS in the customer’s network. In reality, the migration phase will take 
about half a year because the number of Smart Cards is not 4 per TBS, but 3.57 divided by 10 (as 
specified in the points above), however, for testing purposes, and to test the system more 
comprehensively, this supposition is useful in our case. 
 
The test plan document produced by myself explains in detail the steps to do in every single test case, 
however, for simplicity and convenience, I will not write in this thesis all the procedures, just the main 
ideas of them. 
 
Figure 23 below is an edited version of figure 20 from section 4.6.1.1. Here each “Day” corresponds to a 
test case, Day 1 starts with 0 configured OTAK E2EE TRs, so I assumed that every day, during every work 
shift, 4 TRs would be migrated to OTAK E2EE, that is why the line “Number of already configured E2EE 
TRs registering” shows numbers increasing in intervals of 4, I also assumed, that the users of the TRs will 
remain in their own work shift, hence, there will be no user moving from work shift 1 to work shift 2, 
that is to say, by day 2, work shift 1, the only radios already configured for OTAK E2EE will be the ones 
migrated in day 1, work shift 1, and not anyone from any work shift from 2 to 4. 
 
In the figure we can also see that besides of the already explained division of users in 85% and 15%, 
there are 2 lines marking a division in time as 3/5 and 2/5 (which means first 3, 6, 9 and next 2, 4, 6 
minutes, equaling 3 sets of times), this time frames were decided together with the system architect of 
the OTAK E2EE implementation, who gathered statistical information from the customer’s network and 
came up with these times for user registrations to the network. 
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Figure 23 - Number of OTAK messages corresponding to the 4 first test cases of the Initial Phase 
 
 
We have 16 test cases in figure 22, however, the times corresponding to figure 23 should be read as 3 
sets of time, one set of time such as ‘First 3 and Next 2 minutes’, another set of time as ‘First 3 and Next 
4 minutes’ and the last set of time as ‘First 9 and Next 6 minutes’, to come to the conclusion that we 
need to run this test 3 times, with the different sets of time frames mentioned here, for a total of 3 
scenarios per test case (totaling 5, 10 and 15 minutes respectively). The reason for this is to see the 
behavior on the network when the traffic is applied in different time frames, and because in real life, it is 
impossible to have all the users turning on their radios every day at the same time, which would make 
little sense to only test one time scenario per test case. 
 
The “OTAK” numbers of figure 23 show the number of expected messages (UL and DL) exchanged 
between all the TRs in one TBS and the KMF. As seen, the quantity of UL OTAK messages is higher than 
its DL counterpart, this is because in the OTAK signaling protocol there is one extra message going in the 
UL direction. For example, in “Day 1”, for the line corresponding to 3/5 of time (3, 6 or 9 min) there are 
117 DL and 120 UL OTAK messages, which correspond to the initial registrations of 3 TRs to the KMF (the 
extra UL message makes the UL quantity 3 numbers higher than the DL) with the applied crypto plan. 
Due to confidentiality reasons, I am not allowed to explain any further the basis on which I calculated 
the OTAK messages exchanged by every TR during its registration. However, I can say that the amount of 
OTAK messages exchanged is the result of the crypto groups and associations defined in the crypto plan 
upon which the KMF is configured, in our laboratory case, the amount is 39 UL and 40 DL OTAK 
messages per TETRA Radio. 
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Regular phase testing 
 
This section covers the tests performed taking into account the regular conditions of operation of the 
E2EE solution once the migration (or initial) phase has been accomplished. 
 
For this test phase, we designed 6 test cases, I mention “we” because for this phase, due to his expertise 
in the subject, the test engineer in charge of the TETRA infrastructure part (DXT and TBS) designed test 
cases 19 to 22, while I designed only 1 of them, and we both designed the remaining test case together. 
 
For simplicity and convenience, I will not explain in full detail the test cases, however, I will mention 
their purpose and their most important points in the following list: 
 
• Test Case 17: The purpose of this test case was to test the behavior of the network when users 
register at the beginning of a work shift in every day operations, due to the fact that when users 
turn on their TRs, the TR performs the registration protocol to the KMF and OTAK messages are 
exchanged. This was my own contribution to this phase (Regular Phase) of the test plan. 
 
• Test Case 18: The purpose of this test case was to test the result of an end-user action on the 
KMF’s GUI during regular operations. In our E2EE solution, a network administrator can order a 
renewal of encryption keys through the KMF’s GUI, the test consists of renewing the keys of a 
Crypto Group, while users are using the TRs in a regular way during a work shift. This test case 
was a joint contribution by me and the experienced test engineer managing the TETRA Air 
Interface. 
 
• Test Case 19: The target of this test case was to prove that key loading using OTAK works 
properly when users are in an individual call. In essence, the procedure was to create individual 
calls before a crypto period expired, and end those calls once the key load to the TRs had 
finished. 
 
• Test Case 20: In a similar case to test case 19, this test case ensures that key load from KMF to 
TRs works fine in case of a call, however, this time the call is a group call. The procedure in this 
case was to divide the amount of radios in groups and then make a group call in one them 
before the crypto period expiration, then wait until the keys have been loaded in the TRs and 
check for errors or any other inconsistence. 
 
• Test Case 21: This case is similar to test case 20, the difference is that 2 TBS stations are in use, 
hence, less traffic is going in the downlink direction of the TETRA Air Interface while the group 
calls are happening. The main purpose of this test case was to check the correct operation of the 
key loads on a different traffic setting involving one way direction of the voice speech. 
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• Test Case 22: The last one of the test cases for this Regular Phase, was to check that the key 
loads from KMF to TRs work properly when the radios go on and off a call at the same time that 
keys are being loaded. For this purpose, group calls were used. 
 
 
Crypto period testing 
 
This section mentions the expected situations in the customer’s network when the encryption keys 
expire and there is a need to deliver new keys to the TETRA Radios. 
The situations in the 5 test cases comprising this section are closely related to the Regular Phase, 
however, because the crypto period expires only at determined times, the traffic presented during that 
expiration is not precisely affecting the day to day operations most of the time, for which I decided to 
isolate those test cases within their own section. 
 
I will give an overview of the 5 test cases included in this section of the test plan, as well as mention 
their main purpose. However, for simplicity and clarity, I will not explain in detail their steps. 
 
• Test Case 23: The purpose of this test case is to get a baseline of the behavior of the distribution 
of keys for a crypto period change with ideal network conditions (empty network and no fading), 
so then we would compare this behavior with other test cases’ behaviors. 
We had all our TRs up to date and KMF configured correctly, then we waited until the crypto 
period expired and analyzed the traffic in the network. 
 
• Test Case 24: The target of this test case is to verify that the traffic introduced by this solution 
when the crypto period expires would not affect the regular operations in the network. 
This case has the same procedure as test case 23 with the difference than instead of having an 
empty network, we had regular traffic (voice and data) happening in the network, as well as 
fading conditions in order to make it more challenging. This test case was one of my 
contributions. 
 
• Test Case 25: This is a variation of test case 24, in this case, we slightly modified the scenario, so 
when a crypto period expires, instead of sending the new keys to the currently online TRs, we 
decided to have them offline, so they would receive the updates on the keys when they register 
again, the main purpose was to see the behavior of the network with the traffic load produced 
by the crypto period expiration buffered in the server and released at the registration of the 
TRs. In order to challenge the capacity, we switched on all radios at once. This test case was one 
of my contributions. 
 
• Test Case 26: The target of this test was to verify how a user-initiated action affected the crypto 
period change and delivery of keys. 
50 
 
 
For this test, we re-keyed few TRs in KMF’s GUI just before the crypto period expired, in order to 
see if those actions triggered any errors while the crypto period was generating new keys. 
 
• Test Case 27: This test case focuses in 3 main aspects of a radio network performance. The first 
target was to verify that KMF can adapt the OTAK traffic to a variable amount of background 
traffic. The second purpose was to ensure that OTAK downlink messages work even if there is 
fragmentation of packages. The last purpose focuses in verifying that uplink messages are 
correctly handled even if there are repetitions of the same ACKs sent due to collisions when 
competing for access to the radio network by the TRs. 
For this test we had variable background load and fading conditions running, we waited that the 
crypto period expired and analyzed the traffic. 
 
 
Miscellaneous test cases 
 
In this section we had only 1 test case defined, this test case verifies that the KMF is capable to manage 
the delivery of keys also when there is a failure on the wired network connecting it with the DXT 
(through TCS). 
The procedure is to make the TCS unavailable to the KMF during a period of delivery of keys, and verify 
that it resumes the procedure without errors when the TCS was reconnected. 
 
KMF has the capability to connect to many TCSs through different NICs to use as alternate routes when 
one network link fails, however, that feature was tested during product verification in France and it was 
not part of our scope in Helsinki. 
 
Besides of our test case (joint contribution by me and my colleague test engineer), we left this section 
opened for probable future test cases to be added. 
 
 
Load testing 
 
The sole purpose of this testing section was to repeat the most challenging test cases with higher 
amounts of background traffic, or by increasing the amount of CGs and associations in the KMF’s 
configuration. 
 
Not all tests are to be repeated, only the ones that gave more interesting results. 
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4.7.2. AI testing phase 
 
In this section I will explain how and when the tests over the Air Interface were performed, as well as 
the defects found and the procedure to correct them. 
 
 
4.7.2.1. Test plan execution 
 
We starting to execute the test plan in the beginning of October 2015, after I got the knowledge 
corresponding to KMF’s installation, configuration and maintenance, and we configured the planned 
test environment. 
 
The first testing round lasted until beginning of December. In this testing round we found the most 
important errors and submitted them for correction to the corresponding teams. 
After the defects were submitted for corrections, there was a second round of testing, which yielded 
more defects, as well as verification of some corrections. 
At the moment of writing this thesis, the cycle of defect finding and corrections applied is still going on. 
 
There were 2 experienced test engineers and me participating in the project. 
One test engineer (from jyväskylä’s team) was in charge to find defects for the TETRA Radios model 
TH1n, which are in use for OTAK key management. He reported the TR’s defects directly to Jyväskylä 
using their own defect management tool system. 
The second test engineer was in charge of analyzing the traffic over the Air Interface, he is an 
experienced colleague with many years of experience in its field and he was the one leading the hands-
on testing as well as in charge of raising the defects concerning the TETRA network (DXT, TBS, etc.). 
 
My role in the project was to manage everything concerning the E2EE on terms of key management in 
different parts of the system (KMF and TRs’ SCs). My main responsibility was to install, configure and 
maintain the KMF, find defects concerning its operations, submit the defects to the corresponding team 
in France, and follow the corrections of those defects in order to solve the issues and deliver a mature 
product to the deployment team. 
 
During most part of the testing, we all had to debug the information together in order to come up with a 
conclusion. For example, after performing a test case, I had to check the logs in the KMF in order to find 
out what was the exact set of events, and depending on the case, what and where the errors had 
occurred inside of the server. My colleagues, complementarily, had to analyze logs in the DXT-TBS, and 
TRs correspondingly. 
 
 
4.7.2.2. Defects 
 
There were 24 defects found by our team in Helsinki during the first round of testing, which lasted until 
December 2015, some of those defects are very visible to customers, while some others are not so 
visible and require specific conditions to happen, but when they happen, are disastrous to the network, 
yet some other defects, are small and less important than the rest, however, they would need to be 
corrected in the future. 
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I will enumerate in the tables below the defects in order of importance, starting from critical or major 
defects in table 6, passing through the medium-importance defects in table 7, and finishing with the less 
important defects in table 8. 
For convenience, I do not list all of the 24 defects found, since some of them have not enough relevance 
to be mentioned and also, to add simplicity to this thesis, I decided to leave those out. 
 
 
Major or critical defects 
 
A more comprehensive explanation of a given defect is provided after the table if required. 
 
 
Table 6 - Major problems found during E2EE testing over AI 
 
 
Major problem #4 
 
I will explain here the point number 4 mentioned in table 6. 
 
The flow of expected OTAK traffic in perfect conditions from KMF’s point of view is illustrated in the 
following image: 
Severity                                                                                              Major
Problem Description How it was found
1
Backup operation 
interferes with delivery 
of OTAKs
Every day there is an automatic backup at 1 am. If the crypto 
period expires at the same time or during the time that the 
backup is in progress, KMF stops operating and doesn't deliver 
OTAK messages anymore
We need a short crypto period for testing, so I 
configured it to happen every hour sharp, 
because the instance of 01:00 collided with the 
backup, this failure happened
2 Crypto module failures
KMF's crypto module (MGEM + SC4KMF in conjunction with some 
tables in the server's DB) raises an alarm indicating that a SC has 
failed with a fatal state and turns the crypto module indicator 
light in GUI red. We identified 2 scenarios when this happens:
a) When the keys for a given crypto period have not been 
delivered yet (because of congestion in the network) at the time 
a new crypto period begins.
b) When a SC's registration is unsuccessful
a) This point was discovered when besides of 
the background  traffic, we introduced fading 
in the radio spectrum of the AI, that originated 
that the keys were not always delivered in 
time before the next crypto period started.
b) This point was discovered when we 
introduced RCS into the network.
3
Wrong sequence 
number sent at every 
OTAK delivery retry
When KMF does not receive a positive acknowledgement to an 
OTAK message, it retries to deliver it after a timeout expires.
In this case, the sequence number was not increased at the retry 
attempts. This causes problems because sometimes the TR had 
already acknowledge the message but it had not arrived to the 
KMF (because of congestion in the network) before it retried, 
however, the TR was already expected an increment in the 
sequence number (no matter if was a retry of a past OTAK or a 
new OTAK message)
This error came into light when we analyzed 
the signaling traffic with high load over the AI, 
by using background traffic and fading 
conditions, which caused a lot of random 
access collisions.
4
Link Layer Ack arriving 
after Application Layer 
Ack
In perfect conditions, KMF expects to receive first a Link Layer 
acknowledgement before receiving an Application Layer 
acknowledgement (either positive or negative), however, when 
congestion in the network is present, the Application Layer 
acknowledgement might arrive first.
In this case, KMF sent a OTAK #2 (App Layer message) upon 
receiving a positive OTAK Ack #1, however, it then received a 
negative Link Layer #1 Ack, and it resent OTAK #2 because it 
thought that it corresponded to the Link Layer # 2 Ack.
This point is explained more deeply below.
This was in fact one very difficult problem to 
debug and understand, it required high load 
over the AI, and deep analysis in all KMF, DXT, 
TBS and TR's logs in order to figure out the 
exact flow of traffic going on when the 
problem ocurred.
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Figure 24 - OTAK traffic flow in perfect conditions 
 
 
In figure 24, I illustrated the flow of OTAK traffic in a very simplified manner, there are 2 layers involved 
in the exchange of messages, an underlying layer called Link Layer (LL in the figure), and the application 
layer (OTAK). 
When KMF sends a DownLink OTAK message, it expects first a LL Acknowledgement and then an UpLink 
OTAK acknowledging the DL-OTAK received by the end user. 
Figure 24 only shows the expected traffic flow in perfect conditions, however, the traffic flow does not 
always happen in that order. 
 
During our tests, we found out that due to network congestion (mainly in the AI), sometimes the LL-Ack 
arrived later than the UL-OTAK to the KMF, and because KMF was not prepared to receive such a flow of 
traffic, an error occurred. 
 
In the example written in table 6, I give numbers to the OTAKs in order to make the idea clearer. 
KMF first sent a DL-OTAK, I gave to this message the  number 1, then it received the corresponding UL-
OTAK #1 (LL-Ack is missing due to congestion), after that, it continued immediately to deliver the next 
DL-OTAK (#2) for the same subscriber, however, the missing LL-Ack was not mapped to DL-OTAK #1, so 
when that LL-Ack was received late (and it was negative), KMF thought it was meant for OTAK #2 and 
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because it was negative, it concluded that OTAK #2 had failed and retransmitted DL-OTAK #2 
erroneously. 
 
 
Medium importance defects 
 
Table 7 shows the medium importance defects we found during our testing in Helsinki, these errors 
would not cause that the network or the E2EE solution stops working in most of the cases, however, 
some errors would cause it if the conditions in which they are produced happen. 
After the table, I explain in more detail the most important elements from the list. 
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Table 7 - Medium importance defects found in Helsinki 
 
 
 
Severity                                                                                              Medium
Problem Description How it was found
1
KMF does not execute 
commands when set to a 
wrong time zones
In the algorithm of operation of KMF, there is a step in which it 
compares its computer time to the times inserted into the 
commands queued in its DB, in order to send them at the right 
time.
Because the commands in queue are generated with GMT time, 
when the server was configured with a negative time (east of 
GMT), KMF failed to send the OTAKs due to an exception.
During product testing, the French team 
always installed KMF with the French time 
zone. In Helsinki, I installed it with american 
time zone
2
When the amount of 
logs is huge, it takes too 
long to display in GUI
There is no way for the operator to specify what portion of the 
logs saved in DB wants to see displayed in GUI. So when opening 
the logs tab in GUI the full log table from DB is fetched, causing 
the GUI to be unoperable for a determined amount of time
After some weeks of testing, the log table in 
DB became too big, and eventually the time to 
fetch them was too long
3
Useless activation of key 
OTAKs sent over the AI
Every time a crypto period expires, KMF generates a key for the 
CG which expired, a creates a job in DB for every SC to which that 
key must be sent.
If a given SC (ie. a TR put in storage for few months) is away from 
the network for several crypto periods, KMF keeps the jobs to 
activate the keys in its DB, and sends all those activation OTAKs to 
the SC when it comes back online, this causes unecessary load in 
the AI taking the bandwith that could be used for other traffic
Because the crypto period is configured to 1 
hour in our lab, and some times we left few 
TRs offline overnight or on weekends, we 
noticed the huge amount of traffic when we 
wanted to use them again
4
Manual key requst from 
TRs take too long
In our TETRA system, if for some reason a user is not able to 
communicate in a given talk group due to encyption problems, 
he/she can request to get his/her TR's encryption keys renewed 
using his/her TR's menu.
During that procedure, there is one step in which the KMF takes 
too long to process an OTAK message and because of that, the 
user holding the TR has to wait to long and may even cancel the 
operation.
Debugging other problems related to TETRA 
Radios, Jyväskylä's team test engineer 
discovered this problem which then I reported 
as a KMF problem
5
All OTAK messages are 
sent with priority 
"Important"
The recommendation for TETRA standards especify that there 
may be different levels of priority assigned to SDS messaging, 
this priority may be assigned in the TETRA network (DXT) or in a 
system funtioning as a third party application behind a TCS (such 
as KMF).
In our case, KMF was marking all OTAK messages as "Important", 
hence, taking more precedence than other more important 
signaling traffic on the AI.
My collegue, experienced TETRA test 
engineer, discovered this when he was trying 
to tune the OTAK traffic over the AI through 
the DXT, noticing that all OTAKs coming from 
KMF were already set to the "Important" 
status.
6
MGEM authentication 
failure
After installing all necessary software in the windows server, and 
when trying to either start TKM service (deamon for KMF), the 
start up fails indicating an authentication failure between the 
SC4KMF and MGEM.
This was discovered when trying to run KMF 
for the first time.
7
Waste of bandwitdth by 
useless OTAK messages
When KMF sends an OTAK message to a TR, and it does not 
receive an acknowlwdgement confirming the reception of the 
message, it uses a timer to wait for an especified amount of timer 
before trying again. In this case, KMF was resending the OTAK 
message no matter what answer it received, even if the DXT was 
answering that the TR had been switched off manually and it's 
not reachable.
We noticed the attempts to deliver the OTAK 
messages to TRs we left switched on during 
the night or weekends.
8
Operator commands in 
the GUI take to long to 
initiate
An KMF's operator can issue commands to delete all crypto 
configuration from the TR's Smart Card, as well as reload all the 
current crypto configuration.
This commands were not set with the right priority in the queue 
of jobs performed by the KMF, so instead of starting right away, 
some other less important jobs were executed first (ie. the load 
of a future key)
We noticed this when we did manual 
operations on the GUI
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Point #1 
This error is not very probable to happen in the customer network, first, because the computer must be 
in a negative time zone (compared to GMT), which usually means a server in America, and the second 
reason, because the one who installs the DB is usually an engineer from SLC in the process of deploying 
the solution. However, if the DB would have been set in a server with a negative time zone, the KMF 
would simply not work, and no encryption keys would be delivered to TRs. 
 
Point #3 
The time of validity of an encryption key for communication (TEK) depends on the customer’s crypto 
plan, it could vary widely from few days to few months. It is not so probable that a couple of TRs would 
be away for many crypto periods and they would be switched on in the same cell during the same time, 
however, not being probable doesn’t mean that it would not happen, when it happens, the load on the 
AI would be huge, especially if the number of expired crypto periods is high, this could cause that 
important group or individual calls do not get the resources they must have. 
 
The rest of the points in table 7 are self-explanatory. 
 
 
Minor defects 
 
Table 8 shows some of the minor defects we found during our testing. They are not so important and 
are not to be included in the first version of KMF, however, they should be taken into account for 
version 2. 
 
 
Table 8 - Minor defects found during the OTAK E2EE testing over the AI in Helsinki 
 
 
Table 8 concludes this section regarding the description of defects, in section 4.6.2.3 I will discussed the 
cause and solution of the defects (from a tester’s point of view), as well the round 2 of our testing 
performed in Helsinki. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Severity                                                                                              Minor
Problem Description How it was found
1
No mean to delete logs 
from the User Interface
In the KMF's GUI, there is no button or any other mean to delete 
the displayed logs, this makes hard to debug some problems 
because there is need to filter among more data
It is evident in the GUI, after many logs have 
been recorded, I wanted to get rid of the old 
ones
2
No way to delete crypto 
configuration once it has 
been imported
Because this is the first version of KMF, and because a network is 
intended to work with a pre-defined crypto plan, KMF was 
designed tailored to the current customer, and no option is 
available to the administrator to delete crypto configuration (ie. 
Crypto Groups) once they have been imported
For testing purposes, I wanted to modify the 
crypto configuration, then I found out KMF is 
not flexible enough to do this
3
No option to shorten a 
User Group Range
As point 2 describes, once data is imported, there is no option to 
delete it. In this case, a User Group Range of ISSIs could not be 
shortened, which causes problems if we want to use some ISSIs 
from that User Group into another one with different CGs
I wanted to separate the TRs into 2 groups by 
including them in different User Groups, so 
they would receive the encryption keys 
belonging to different CGs
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4.7.2.3. Results, benefits and solution of found defects 
 
The project resulted in a quite extensive work which took more time than anticipated. Many defects 
were found, some of them very critical, which would have degraded or completely crashed parts of the 
customer network in case they would have happened in the field. 
 
The testing over the Air Interface was, in my opinion, a critical part of the End-to-End Encryption 
solution’s validation, due to the fact that the Air Interface is the bottleneck of traffic of any 
wireless/cellular network because of the physical characteristics and utilization of the radio spectrum. 
 
The results of this verification work yielded a better working solution with a more mature product (KMF) 
in its core, which greatly benefits Secure Land Communication’s portfolio overall and validates the 
correct operation of new features (Over The Air Keying) to an existing End-to-End Encryption solution, 
upgrading in this way the capacity and performance of encryption key delivery to end users compared to 
previous methods of delivering the keys in question. This benefits not only the company and our 
systems portfolio, but also our customers and their personnel, which now will have a more automated 
and easy way of distributing the encryption keys needed for their daily communications. 
 
At the time of finishing this thesis, most of the defects mentioned above have been solved, special 
attention was taken towards the critical ones, these defect corrections have been implemented in 
several instances of software. We, our testing team in Helsinki, worked closely with the TETRA Radio 
terminal team from Jyväskylä and the KMF’s development team from France, having continuous 
communication over email, phone and workshops were all teams were working physically together. This 
cooperation allowed us to develop corrections and test them in several iterations of software for both 
KMF and TR sides (the rest of the network didn’t suffer considerable changes) 
 
Starting from January, we have been testing subsequent improvements in KMF’s software, 
improvements that besides fixing some of the defects found before December, have also introduced 
some new errors. 
From January 2016 until the time of writing this thesis, 12 new defects have been found, from those 12 
defects, 3 have already been fixed, and from the remaining 9, the major ones are expected to be fixed 
by the next iteration of the KMF software. 
 
KMF, at this point in time, still have issues, but it also has improved significantly, I discuss this in sections 
6 and 7 later in this thesis. 
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5. My contributions in a nutshell 
 
 
My role during this project was mainly to be the person in charge of the Key Management Facility server 
in Helsinki, taking care of installing it, configuring it, keep it working, finding its defects, analyze those 
defects, report them to the development team, follow the defects’ solution process, and test the 
corrections for those defects in order to ensure that there are no critical errors that could affect the 
traffic on the customer’s network in terms of the Air Interface’s signaling capacity. 
 
The testing was divided in different geographical areas depending on what parts of the system were to 
be tested. In Helsinki, we tested 3 parts of the system, one was the TETRA Radio terminals, the second 
was the DXT-TBS connection, these parts were tested by 2 test engineers, and the KMF was my 
responsibility. 
 
In order to perform my job, I first learned the basic theory of how End-to-End Encryption in SLC’s TETRA 
networks work, for that I read different company papers and part of the SFPG recommendations 
whitepapers. The second step was to be trained in the technical details of the KMF itself, for that I spent 
some time in France with the team in charge of testing the KMF on a product level, then I continued 
experimenting myself in Helsinki by installing and configuring our own KMF servers. 
Lastly, I participated in the system level testing together with the test engineers assigned to this project. 
 
Another of my important contributions to this project was to write the test plan and test strategy which 
depicted the overall testing we would perform in Helsinki, and then present this test strategy/plan to 
the project managers. 
 
As clarified throughout this thesis, I did not work alone in this project, since the complexity of it would 
have been much more than I could have handled by myself, however, I was part of the core team during 
the whole process of our testing in Helsinki, and my contributions were valuable to advance the 
technical quality of the E2EE solution and made the process of KMF’s defect management smooth for 
the rest of the team, so they could concentrate in their own areas. 
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6. Comparison with other solutions 
 
Secure Land Communications already had in its portfolio a solution to deploy End-to-End Encrypted 
communication, however, this solution fell short in terms of scalability and performance for wider 
networks, for this reason, the End-to-End Encryption solution described in this thesis was created, in 
order to solve a problem from one of our customers, the deployment in their network of End-to-End 
Encryption mechanisms for hundreds of thousands of users. 
 
There are significant differences in the implementation of E2EE between the old solution, and the new 
solution. First, I will show a graphical overview of the old solution’s architecture, after that, I will explain 
the main differences when comparing that old solution, with the new one described throughout this 
thesis, and at the end, I will mention End-to-End Encryption in systems other than TETRA. 
 
 
6.1. Overview of our old solution for End-to-End Encryption 
 
Following is a simplified example of the architecture comprising the KMC E2EE solution 
 
 
Figure 25 - KMC based E2EE solution architecture 
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As shown in figure 25, there is one dispatcher and 3 base stations connected to the core network. The 
dispatcher, together with the base stations containing the operational radios are working in a regular 
way, making and receiving calls, sending text message, and other daily operations. The base station on 
the left, however, is dedicated for one sole purpose, to connect the Key Management Center to the core 
network for exchange of encryption keys between itself, and the users (radios, dispatchers) to whom it 
serves. This is achieved by using a TETRA Radio as a gateway between the server and the base station. 
All messages use the OTAK protocol, and Short Data Service (equivalent to SMS in GSM) is used as a 
bearer for this messages, just as in our solution featuring KMF. 
 
The inherent nature of the radio air interface make a bottleneck of traffic in the network when a server 
tries to deliver content to the end users, and that makes this solution unsuitable when there is a large 
amount of users in the network. 
 
 
6.2. Comparison between End-to-End Encryption featuring Key 
Management Center and Key Management Facility 
 
As we notice from figure 25 and figure 21 from section 4.6.1.2, the main difference between the old and 
new solutions is the way the server connects to the core network. 
 
In the old solution, KMC is inside of the TETRA network, connected to the exchange via a radio gateway, 
which in turn connects to a base station. The throughput on the air interface is quite low compared to a 
fixed network, and it very much limits the amount of data that can be sent/received by the server, for 
this reason, that solution was designed to support only about 500 subscribers. 
 
The new solution comprising KMF is designed to support up to 40 000 users, the server, renamed Key 
Management Facility instead of Key Management Center, is acting a third party application outside the 
TETRA network, and connects over Ethernet via a API called TETRA Connectivity Server, the methods 
used in this API translate the instructions from the server to the TETRA network when sending/receiving 
data. 
KMF is a completely different product in comparison with KMC, the theory and basis are the same, but 
the implementation is completely different, because KMF has been designed to support almost 100 
times more users than its predecessor, for this reason, the internals in the server were designed to 
support a better performance, scalability and response times. 
 
There are some other minor differences in between the old E2EE solution based on KMC, and the new 
one based in KMF, however, they are side effects of the new implementation and do not have a major 
importance to be mentioned here. 
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Figure 26.a - Throughput between KMC/KMF and DXT 
 
 
The throughput mentioned in figure 26.a only takes into account the connection between the KMC/KMF 
and the Digital eXchange for TETRA (DXT), not the whole path from the KMC/KMF and the end user. The 
whole path is not included here because it’s variable in nature, due to the fact that it depends on the Air 
Interface behavior between the end users/radios and the TETRA Base Stations where those radios are 
connected. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26.b - Number of users supported in KMC/KMF 
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Figure 26.c - Delivery time for one crypto period’s keys within one TETRA Base Station 
 
 
Figure 26.c shows the average time to deliver 5300 keys from the KMC/KMF to the 35 TETRA Radios 
operating within one TETRA Base Station, this calculations take into account perfect radio conditions (no 
fading or background traffic). 
 
In Figure 26.a (throughput), we see that the throughput comparison shows a much bigger difference 
compared to figure 26.c (delivery time). The smaller difference in figure 26.c (delivery) is due to the fact 
that it includes the whole path to deliver the keys, that is, when the testing was done, the OTAK 
protocol messages traverse the whole path from KMF, all the way through the Ethernet wired network, 
DXT, TBS and TETRA air interface. Being this last section the slowest point causing a bottleneck in the 
flow of the traffic. 
In our new End-to-End Encryption solution, even if the connection between the server (KMF) and the 
exchange (DXT) uses Ethernet connectivity, the other side of the connection (air interface between base 
station and end user’s radio) still uses a 9.6 Kbs circuit switched connection to send and receive Short 
Data Messages, hence, the difference in the times in figure 26.c is not as significant as the difference in 
throughput in figure 26.a. 
 
 
6.3. Solutions in public commercial networks (non-TETRA) 
 
At the moment of writing this thesis, there is a big boom of end-to-end encryption implementation in 
mainstream networks due to the recent deployment of end-to-end encryption by WhatsApp in its 
services. According to the magazine Fortune (2016), other chat service providers such as Viber are also 
following WhatsApp in the direction of end-to-end encryption. 
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WhatsApp End-to-End Encryption 
 
As specified by WhatsApp (2016) in its end-to-end encryption overview technical paper, the company 
has starting to use the mentioned technology to encrypt all its conversations and file transfers (including 
any kind of media) for all its users. 
 
There are few significant differences from WhatsApp approach to end-to-end encryption and our 
approach in Secure Land Communications: 
 
 
Table 9 - Main differences between WhatsApp and SLC’s E2EE systems 
 
The reason for the differences shown in table 9 is due to the business needs in both public and private 
networks. 
Since WhatsApp is an application running over public internet, it is available to the general public, on the 
other hand, TETRA networks are aimed mostly to public safety organizations such as police, army or fire 
departments, for this reason, the requirements and business needs are different in nature. 
 
WhatsApp has a very good encryption mechanism which uses one encryption key per every message 
exchanged, this carries very good security, however, because it needs to derive a key every single time it 
sends content, it is very slow for the needs of our customers which require fast performance in 
emergency situations. 
 
Another major difference is the role of the network infrastructure in the end-to-end encryption process. 
While in public commercial networks such as the internet, WhatsApp can provide true end-to-end 
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encryption by generating keys in the end user equipment when they install the application, that leaves 
the network servers in the role of a relay server, whose only task is to pass along the encrypted 
messages, this is an issue in the eyes of law enforcement agencies, as described by the New York Times 
(2016). 
On the other hand, because our customers are mostly public security organisms, they require access to 
end-to-end encrypted material for lawful interception purposes, while at the same time they need end-
to-end encryption to be protected in case parts of the networks get compromised. For this reason, this 
project’s implementation of E2EE uses the KMF, in order to generate and distribute the keys to end user 
equipment, but also keeps a copy in a recorder server which can be used in case communication needs 
to be monitored. 
 
 
6.4. How to apply this solution in public mobile services/technologies 
 
It is somewhat hard to visualize this solution applied to the mainstream mobile communications for the 
following reasons: 
 
a) In public mobile networks such as GSM/UMTS/LTE, there is no need to divide the users in 
organizations. Everybody can speak to any other person in earth as long as there is connectivity 
between their carriers; users are not limited to certain groups or areas. In this way, the concept 
of organizations and groups/fleets is no longer valid, which makes control encryption keys more 
difficult. 
b) In private networks such as TETRA, the amount of users is not so high, plus the “organizations” 
concept limits the amount of users to only a couple of thousands, which can easily be served by 
the KMF. In public networks, 40 000 users (the amount supported by KMF) wouldn’t be even 
close to the amount needed to support end-to-end encryption in a country. 
 
On the other hand, if the following requisites are satisfied, the end-to-end encryption system explained 
in the thesis would be applicable: 
 
a) There is a need/law in a country mandating the possibility to record communications for lawful 
interception, while at the same time keeping confidentiality by encrypting communications for 
eavesdroppers/hackers. 
b) If the amount of users is too high, replication of certain users’ keys for inter-city communication 
is performed among KMFs in order to accomplished long distance communication. 
c) If a company or institution has non-TETRA mobile technology, such as UMTS, the same concepts 
for encryption may be applied, as long as the KMF server is coded in a way that instead of 
sending OTAK protocol messages for a TETRA API, it sends messages designed to interact with 
the mentioned mobile technology (UMTS in this example). 
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7. Summary and conclusions 
 
 
This Thesis has served the purpose of finding a number of significant errors mostly in the core product of 
the solution, the Key Management Facility. 
 
Due to the fact that the KMF is newly developed, critical and interesting errors have been found during 
the testing phase we have performed in Helsinki. Which, if not found, would have caused severe 
consequences in the customer’s network, which would have led to not only the misbehavior of other 
devices and bad performance, but also affect the image of Secure Land Communication’s products in 
terms of quality. 
 
By performing the testing described in this thesis, we have ensured that adding to the customer’s 
network the Ent-to-End Encryption solution with Over The Air Keying capability will result in a significant 
reduction of management efforts for the customer’s technical personnel in terms of delivery of 
encryption keys to the TETRA Radio equipment present in the network, this without the risk of 
unwanted side effects. 
 
Both the TETRA Radios (not covered in this thesis) and the Key Management Facility server were 
significantly improved during the testing efforts performed throughout this thesis work. However, the 
major benefit of this thesis’ work, in my opinion, is the addition of a new product (and solution overall) 
to the company’s portfolio, which will yield benefits not only now that it will be deployed with our 
current customer, but also in the future since we will be able to offer it to other customers as a neat 
feature of our systems. 
 
It is true that the work during this thesis did not solve all the problems, however, it improved the 
solution’s quality significantly. In the next section, I will discuss what is left and needs to be addressed in 
the future. 
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8. Future work 
 
 
Although most critical issues have been solved until the time of writing this thesis, there are still non-
critical issues which must be corrected in subsequence versions of the solution. 
 
For instance, the KMF’s GUI is a weak point in the overall solution, mostly because of the inflexibility of 
modifying some parameters, as for example, the ability to delete old Key Encryption Keys from KMF’s 
database and other small details which do not cause a direct impact on the operations of the 
network/solution, but which can be noticed by the customer once he starts using the system. 
 
Another area of improvement could be to use talk group addressing (Group Short Subscriber Identity) 
instead of individual addressing (Individual Short Subscriber Identity) to deliver the OTAK messages, this 
would very much benefit the impact of the OTAK traffic on the downlink direction, however, a technique 
to acknowledge correctly the reception of the mentioned OTAKs must be designed. 
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